Starting with Sept. 11, it seems that everything that could have gone wrong at the former Deutsche Bank building has. While deconstruction is slated to recommence next month, many have expressed skepticism whether the project will be finished this year.
1. Is the 15-day fire safety inspection schedule unfeasible and unrealistic?
2. Is anyone protecting the health/safety of the (often undocumented) "misclassified" workers that are typically hired to undertake deconstruction projects of this kind?
3. After D.A. Morgenthau's investigation of the Deutsche Bank is complete, will there be more accountability for safety.
Friday, February 29, 2008
Chad's questions
How big of a problem is falling debris of buildings in New York City?
Is there any way to protect people completely from falling debris or do New Yorker’s, every day, run a risk of getting injured?
What’s the city’s record like when it comes to falling debris?
How safe are sidewalk sheds?
Who can I speak to that knows more information?
Does safety sometimes get foregone for building speed?
Who's more at risk for getting hit by falling debris, construction workers or pedestrians?
Besides falling debris, what are some new ways of protecting people on the ground from falling debris?
Emergency Preparedness - Giegerich Questions
How has your evaluation process changed since 911?
Please explain in detail how buildings are evaluated?
What are the most important things to take into consideration? height? building material? use of space?
What are the last things that you look at when evaluating a buildling for safety preparedness?How do you make buildlings safer?
Please give a few examples of typical corrections that need to be made to buildings?
What are the worst problems a buildling can face in terms of safety preparedness?
Tell me about the hardest building to prepare for emergencies versus the easiest kind of buildling?
Who do you have to consult with and what about each person/office makes that person's opinion/expertise/knowledge valuable?
How many buildings have you worked with?
How long does the process take?
Do you recommend that every hi-rise in NYC be evaluated by your company or another one like it? Why?
What percentage of buildings in NYC do you think are truly prepared for emergencies?
Are most buildings sufficiently prepared before you get to them?
How important is effective communication in the case of an emergency?
How do you ensure that communication will not fail in the case of any emergency?
What kind of communication system do you suggest?
Do you have multiple back up systems in case one or more fail?
What have been some of the consequences due to communication failure in an emergency in a hi-rise?
Over the last seven years, what has been done to increase communication efficiency during emergencies, especially since communication was a major problem in 911 as it is in many other emergencies?
What government agencies do you work with and how does your work coincide with theirs?What are some complaints you have about buildlings that do no adhere to your standards and are they putting residents and bystanders at risk by failing to be adequately emergency prepared? In what ways?
Please explain in detail how buildings are evaluated?
What are the most important things to take into consideration? height? building material? use of space?
What are the last things that you look at when evaluating a buildling for safety preparedness?How do you make buildlings safer?
Please give a few examples of typical corrections that need to be made to buildings?
What are the worst problems a buildling can face in terms of safety preparedness?
Tell me about the hardest building to prepare for emergencies versus the easiest kind of buildling?
Who do you have to consult with and what about each person/office makes that person's opinion/expertise/knowledge valuable?
How many buildings have you worked with?
How long does the process take?
Do you recommend that every hi-rise in NYC be evaluated by your company or another one like it? Why?
What percentage of buildings in NYC do you think are truly prepared for emergencies?
Are most buildings sufficiently prepared before you get to them?
How important is effective communication in the case of an emergency?
How do you ensure that communication will not fail in the case of any emergency?
What kind of communication system do you suggest?
Do you have multiple back up systems in case one or more fail?
What have been some of the consequences due to communication failure in an emergency in a hi-rise?
Over the last seven years, what has been done to increase communication efficiency during emergencies, especially since communication was a major problem in 911 as it is in many other emergencies?
What government agencies do you work with and how does your work coincide with theirs?What are some complaints you have about buildlings that do no adhere to your standards and are they putting residents and bystanders at risk by failing to be adequately emergency prepared? In what ways?
Starkey Questions
Changes in safety code seem largely reactive. Has the city historically been proactive in making any changes?
What impact did the 37 and 68 changes have on safety, since they seem to have come about as a result of builders' economic concerns?
Is it possible to protect workers or residents in high rises from a tragedy of scale similar to the attacks on 911, since those attacks have been a main driver for change?
Before the Triangle fire what were the concerns for safety in high-rises? Was there any discussion, regulations approved? What codes were subsequently approved and how long did it take? Did it start a safety movement nationwide? Please explain the last answer in terms of where changes were made, what the changes were and how quickly they came about after the fire.
What impact did the 37 and 68 changes have on safety, since they seem to have come about as a result of builders' economic concerns?
Is it possible to protect workers or residents in high rises from a tragedy of scale similar to the attacks on 911, since those attacks have been a main driver for change?
Before the Triangle fire what were the concerns for safety in high-rises? Was there any discussion, regulations approved? What codes were subsequently approved and how long did it take? Did it start a safety movement nationwide? Please explain the last answer in terms of where changes were made, what the changes were and how quickly they came about after the fire.
Galyean Questions - Fire Safety Codes
Preliminary list of questions for the NYC Building Dept. (ideally Commissioner Lancaster):
Preliminary list of questions for the Port Authority:
- Which of the recommendations from the 1995 report on the 1993 World Trade Center evacuation report have been included in the city building code?
- When were they included?
- Who supported the inclusion?
- Who opposed the inclusion?
- Which ones were not included?
- Why not?
- Who supported the inclusion?
- Who opposed the inclusion?
- Is there any evidence to suggest that those changes, if made, would have saved any lives in the second attack in 2001?
- Are those recommendations reflected in the 2008 city building code revisions for high-rise buildings?
- Who is responsible for overseeing implementation of the codes? How is that monitored? What are the consequences of non-compliance? What is the rate of non-compliance?
- Are there waivers? For whom? Under what circumstances?
- Is there a concern that safety is compromised when waivers are granted?
Preliminary list of questions for the Port Authority:
- Which of the recommendations from the 1995 report on the 1993 World Trade Center evacuation report were implemented by September 11, 2001?
- Were they helpful in evacuating survivors?
- Why were the other recommendations not implemented?
- Is there any evidence to suggest that those recommendations, if implemented, would have saved any lives in the second attack in 2001?
- Why did the Port Authority redesign the floor plans to remove the fourth staircase from each tower?
- Will the 1995 safety recommendations be reflected in the construction of the new tower? Which ones? Why? Why not?
- Will the 2005 safety recommendations be reflected in the construction of the new towers? Which ones? Why? Why not?
- Will the new tower adhere to the 2008 New York City building codes?
- What measures are being taken in the design of the new tower in place of or in addition to the New York City building code to ensure fire safety and evacuation?
Building Design Questions
-What (architectural and engineering) design changes have taken place in skyscrapers since 9-11?
-Where does the United States stand in skyscraper design and safety innovation?
-Which materials do you see being incorporated the most for fire safety in skyscrapers? How do you test them?
-What difference in skyscraper safety design do you notice between Class A and Class B buildings?
-What are some ways design could be used to make older skyscrapers safer?
-How could older buildings' materials be upgraded in a cost-effective way?
-Where so you see the importance of (architects, engineers) in exploring new design techniques in skyscraper construction?
-What is the opinion in the (architectural, engineering) community about innovating new safety measures? How has it or has it not become a priority since 9-11?
-In what ways have (architects, engineers) been working together to develop safer ways to build high rises?
-How important is it to the architectural/engineering community to design safer skyscrapers?
-What safety concerns do you see as most important for (architects, engineers)?
-How does your firm approach skyscraper safety?
-Considering the impact the damage to the World Trade Center had on the surrounding buildings, how have (architects, engineers) approached the safety of their design in regards to neighboring buildings?
-How easy is it to bypass or innovate building safety codes?
-How restrictive are building codes on (architectural, engineering) designs? Do you find them problematic?
-What are some conversations that have taken place within the (architectural, engineering) community since 9-11 regarding skyscraper design and safety? Has there been less pressure to innovate or conform as we get further away from 9-11 or do you think that it remains an important issue that (architects, engineers) are actively exploring?
-Among U.S. cities, where does New York's new skyscrapers stand among safety, design and innovation? Among world cities?
-If there was funding available to test different techniques of design for safety, would more firms try to innovate? On a scale of 1 to 10, how important are safety considerations in building design?
-How would incorporating certain safety measures alter the integrity of a building's design? How important is that to you?
-Where does the United States stand in skyscraper design and safety innovation?
-Which materials do you see being incorporated the most for fire safety in skyscrapers? How do you test them?
-What difference in skyscraper safety design do you notice between Class A and Class B buildings?
-What are some ways design could be used to make older skyscrapers safer?
-How could older buildings' materials be upgraded in a cost-effective way?
-Where so you see the importance of (architects, engineers) in exploring new design techniques in skyscraper construction?
-What is the opinion in the (architectural, engineering) community about innovating new safety measures? How has it or has it not become a priority since 9-11?
-In what ways have (architects, engineers) been working together to develop safer ways to build high rises?
-How important is it to the architectural/engineering community to design safer skyscrapers?
-What safety concerns do you see as most important for (architects, engineers)?
-How does your firm approach skyscraper safety?
-Considering the impact the damage to the World Trade Center had on the surrounding buildings, how have (architects, engineers) approached the safety of their design in regards to neighboring buildings?
-How easy is it to bypass or innovate building safety codes?
-How restrictive are building codes on (architectural, engineering) designs? Do you find them problematic?
-What are some conversations that have taken place within the (architectural, engineering) community since 9-11 regarding skyscraper design and safety? Has there been less pressure to innovate or conform as we get further away from 9-11 or do you think that it remains an important issue that (architects, engineers) are actively exploring?
-Among U.S. cities, where does New York's new skyscrapers stand among safety, design and innovation? Among world cities?
-If there was funding available to test different techniques of design for safety, would more firms try to innovate? On a scale of 1 to 10, how important are safety considerations in building design?
-How would incorporating certain safety measures alter the integrity of a building's design? How important is that to you?
Site to check out
I came across a site that might be helpful background info for a lot of people, The Safety Library
The site has information on:
Disasters (disaster safety, emergency management, terrorism)
Hazards and controls (biological safety, chemical safety, environmental safety, fire safety, physical hazards, etc.)
Industry Safety
Laws and Regulations
Safety Management
In addition to compiling research, the site also has a great number of links updated constantly on the issues listed above and others (the list is pretty long, but I selected the most relevant ones for the list above).
The site has information on:
Disasters (disaster safety, emergency management, terrorism)
Hazards and controls (biological safety, chemical safety, environmental safety, fire safety, physical hazards, etc.)
Industry Safety
Laws and Regulations
Safety Management
In addition to compiling research, the site also has a great number of links updated constantly on the issues listed above and others (the list is pretty long, but I selected the most relevant ones for the list above).
Thursday, February 28, 2008
Questions
What do you think is the most advanced and helpful type of safety gadgetry for high-rise buildings?
Do you think these advances have helped prevent further tragedies?
How does your device help in keeping the public safe?
Are these devices hard to market to buyers?
What type of people are buying these devices?
Do you think these advances have helped prevent further tragedies?
How does your device help in keeping the public safe?
Are these devices hard to market to buyers?
What type of people are buying these devices?
Residential High Rises
I would like to explore the evacuation procedures and mandates for residential high-rise buildings. An article published in The Cooperator, a monthly condo and co-op publication, pointed out: “Although no New York City law requires that residential buildings have an emergency evacuation or management plan, experts generally agree that it’s smart for residential buildings to consider what they would do in the case of an emergency.”The article goes on to say that exit signs are required, as well as floor plans that mark the points of exit in case of an emergency. “Beyond those things, however, the city of New York doesn’t require that residential buildings formulate or maintain an emergency management or evacuation plan, nor do they require that these buildings make use of the photoluminescent exit path markings that are required by Local Law 26 of commercial buildings over the height of 75 feet.”I’d like to get in touch with the building management at some of New York’s highest high-rise residential buildings and see if they have formulated an effective evacuation plan in case of an emergency. The article’s link is: http://cooperator.com/articles/1352/1/Planning-for-Emergency-Evacuation/Page1.html
Interview Questions - Residential High Rise Evac. Proceedures
Interview Questions:
1. Why aren't evacuation management procedures required in residential buildings in New York City?
2. Why aren't residential buildings required to have photoluminescent lighting to aid in evacuations as is required of commercial buildings by Local Law 26, a part of the New York Building Code?
Questions for Building Management:
1. Do have an evacuation management procedure for the tenants in your building -- even though one is not required by the city?
2. If so, what is it?
3. Did your evacuation plan change after 9/11? If so, how?
4. What considerations were made when formulating your evacuation plan?
5. If you don't have an evacuation management proceedure, why not?
1. Why aren't evacuation management procedures required in residential buildings in New York City?
2. Why aren't residential buildings required to have photoluminescent lighting to aid in evacuations as is required of commercial buildings by Local Law 26, a part of the New York Building Code?
Questions for Building Management:
1. Do have an evacuation management procedure for the tenants in your building -- even though one is not required by the city?
2. If so, what is it?
3. Did your evacuation plan change after 9/11? If so, how?
4. What considerations were made when formulating your evacuation plan?
5. If you don't have an evacuation management proceedure, why not?
High-Rise Safety Gadgets
There have been many technical advances in safety equipment for high-rise buildings since the tragic events of 9/11. From ramps to parachutes, these devices range from the practical to the borderline ridiculous. Which can help prevent future tragedies.
Air Quality questions
Feb. 29, 2008: Mike Weiss' Questions for Interviews:
The focus of the class investigation is to, broadly, find out what has changed since 9/11. To relate this to air quality issues, my first step was to:
1. Define exactly what was the air quality problem at 9/11, and
2. Reveal how this has been addressed (or not)
1. The air quality problem from 9/11 is that after the disaster, approximately 6000 people developed serious health issues as the result of being unnecessarily exposed to hazardous air. This happened because of the disorganization of the government agencies responsible for monitoring air quality and broadcasting alerts.
2. To investigate whether the government agencies responsible for air quality monitoring and alerting have gotten more organized to handle both a repeat 9/11-type disaster or the current building boom air quality threats in lower Manhattan, I have interviewed, or am in the process of interviewing, the following people:
Robert Spencer, WTC Community Labor Coalition: He gave me a bunch of leads, explained how the original plan for the demolition of the Deutsche Bank building was not communicated with FDNY, how his group repeatedly called for a separation between the “remediation” contractors (those who remove the contaminated 9/11 dust) and the demolition contractors. This provided one of the early blueprints for how to maintain safe air quality in rebuilding after a contamination-related disaster.
Paul Stein, PEF (public employee federal) Division 199 (“local”) works for the NYS Dept. of Health in an office at 90 Church Street, and is a union representative. He was very active in getting his building, 90 Church, cleaned after 9/11 but knows that most buildings still remain dirty. He places the blame for the 9/11 air-control issues on the Federal EPA for not actively becoming the necessary central authority at the scene. Since he has dealt with air quality issues over the years since 9/11, I asked him for help in unraveling the myriad government agencies involved. He told me, “you’re confused? A lot of people are confused.”
Dr. Paul Lioy, UMDNJ: very active in occupational health issues and with Dr. Philip Landrigan at Mount Sinai Medical Center, wrote a few papers on 9/11 health issues. He forcefully contradicted Paul Stein’s assessment, saying the problem was not with EPA (“why does everyone lay that on their doorstep?”) but rather with OSHA, since most of the effected people were workers. He asked me to read his papers before granting me a second interview, which I am doing now.
Dave Newman, NYCOSH (New York Committee for Occupational Safety and Health). Newman was part of EPA’s WTC Expert Technical Review Panel which in 2005 submitted reports about 9/11 air quality handling procedures. He left there, joined NYCOSH, and in 2007 presented a report to the U.S. Senate about EPA’s response during 9/11 (“EPA’S Response to 9/11 and Lessons Learned for Future Emergency Preparedness.”). I told him I was looking for any air quality procedures/regulations that have been changed since 9/11. “What did you find,” he asked me. When I told him I didn’t find too much yet, he said, “there aren’t any.” Newman suggested that I read the Federal “NRP” (National Response Plan) which was in place before 9/11 and lays out the government chain of command/responsibilities during a 9/11-type emergency. He wants me to understand how this works before explaining to me, in a second interview, what went wrong during 9/11 and also, why nothing is being done to correct this now.
Thomas Kunkel, Director, LMCCC (Lower Manhattan Construction Command Center). After 9/11, NYS set up the LMDC (Lower Manhattan Development Corp.) as a way to channel the $10 BILLION dollars in Federal grants to redevelop lower Manhattan. After distributing this money, LMDC disbanded and turned over the reins of State monitoring of lower Manhattan construction to the newly formed LMCCC. LMCCC’s web site states that it is involved with monitoring air conditions in lower Manhattan, but it is very confusing how they do this, how they coordinate their results with the Federal EPA, and most importantly, are they in fact officially mandated as responsible for monitoring air quality and issuing alerts. As an agency charged with coordinating construction, it would be reasonable to be suspicious of their air monitoring/alerting credibility. I have tried to speak to Thomas Kunkel, LMCCC Director, who requested that I go through this office of media affairs. They asked me to submit a list of questions, which I immediately did. They are still reviewing my request for an interview.
I would also like to try and interview someone at EPA (their “Region 2” office is located on Broadway near City Hall), as well as someone from OSHA. I would especially like to get an understanding of the significance of last week’s big OSHA fines to the Deutsche Bank contractors, and whether this signals a new era of OSHA regulatory control.
The focus of the class investigation is to, broadly, find out what has changed since 9/11. To relate this to air quality issues, my first step was to:
1. Define exactly what was the air quality problem at 9/11, and
2. Reveal how this has been addressed (or not)
1. The air quality problem from 9/11 is that after the disaster, approximately 6000 people developed serious health issues as the result of being unnecessarily exposed to hazardous air. This happened because of the disorganization of the government agencies responsible for monitoring air quality and broadcasting alerts.
2. To investigate whether the government agencies responsible for air quality monitoring and alerting have gotten more organized to handle both a repeat 9/11-type disaster or the current building boom air quality threats in lower Manhattan, I have interviewed, or am in the process of interviewing, the following people:
Robert Spencer, WTC Community Labor Coalition: He gave me a bunch of leads, explained how the original plan for the demolition of the Deutsche Bank building was not communicated with FDNY, how his group repeatedly called for a separation between the “remediation” contractors (those who remove the contaminated 9/11 dust) and the demolition contractors. This provided one of the early blueprints for how to maintain safe air quality in rebuilding after a contamination-related disaster.
Paul Stein, PEF (public employee federal) Division 199 (“local”) works for the NYS Dept. of Health in an office at 90 Church Street, and is a union representative. He was very active in getting his building, 90 Church, cleaned after 9/11 but knows that most buildings still remain dirty. He places the blame for the 9/11 air-control issues on the Federal EPA for not actively becoming the necessary central authority at the scene. Since he has dealt with air quality issues over the years since 9/11, I asked him for help in unraveling the myriad government agencies involved. He told me, “you’re confused? A lot of people are confused.”
Dr. Paul Lioy, UMDNJ: very active in occupational health issues and with Dr. Philip Landrigan at Mount Sinai Medical Center, wrote a few papers on 9/11 health issues. He forcefully contradicted Paul Stein’s assessment, saying the problem was not with EPA (“why does everyone lay that on their doorstep?”) but rather with OSHA, since most of the effected people were workers. He asked me to read his papers before granting me a second interview, which I am doing now.
Dave Newman, NYCOSH (New York Committee for Occupational Safety and Health). Newman was part of EPA’s WTC Expert Technical Review Panel which in 2005 submitted reports about 9/11 air quality handling procedures. He left there, joined NYCOSH, and in 2007 presented a report to the U.S. Senate about EPA’s response during 9/11 (“EPA’S Response to 9/11 and Lessons Learned for Future Emergency Preparedness.”). I told him I was looking for any air quality procedures/regulations that have been changed since 9/11. “What did you find,” he asked me. When I told him I didn’t find too much yet, he said, “there aren’t any.” Newman suggested that I read the Federal “NRP” (National Response Plan) which was in place before 9/11 and lays out the government chain of command/responsibilities during a 9/11-type emergency. He wants me to understand how this works before explaining to me, in a second interview, what went wrong during 9/11 and also, why nothing is being done to correct this now.
Thomas Kunkel, Director, LMCCC (Lower Manhattan Construction Command Center). After 9/11, NYS set up the LMDC (Lower Manhattan Development Corp.) as a way to channel the $10 BILLION dollars in Federal grants to redevelop lower Manhattan. After distributing this money, LMDC disbanded and turned over the reins of State monitoring of lower Manhattan construction to the newly formed LMCCC. LMCCC’s web site states that it is involved with monitoring air conditions in lower Manhattan, but it is very confusing how they do this, how they coordinate their results with the Federal EPA, and most importantly, are they in fact officially mandated as responsible for monitoring air quality and issuing alerts. As an agency charged with coordinating construction, it would be reasonable to be suspicious of their air monitoring/alerting credibility. I have tried to speak to Thomas Kunkel, LMCCC Director, who requested that I go through this office of media affairs. They asked me to submit a list of questions, which I immediately did. They are still reviewing my request for an interview.
I would also like to try and interview someone at EPA (their “Region 2” office is located on Broadway near City Hall), as well as someone from OSHA. I would especially like to get an understanding of the significance of last week’s big OSHA fines to the Deutsche Bank contractors, and whether this signals a new era of OSHA regulatory control.
Giegerich Questions
How has your evaluation process changed since 911?
Please explain in detail how buildings are evaluated?
What are the most important things to take into consideration? height? building material? use of space?
What are the last things that you look at when evaluating a buildling for safety preparedness?
How do you make buildlings safer?
Please give a few examples of typical corrections that need to be made to buildings?
What are the worst problems a buildling can face in terms of safety preparedness?
Tell me about the hardest building to prepare for emergencies versus the easiest kind of buildling?
Who do you have to consult with and what about each person/office makes that person's opinion/expertise/knowledge valuable?
How many buildings have you worked with?
How long does the process take?
Do you recommend that every hi-rise in NYC be evaluated by your company or another one like it?
Why?
What percentage of buildings in NYC do you think are truly prepared for emergencies?
Are most buildings sufficiently prepared before you get to them?
How important is effective communication in the case of an emergency?
How do you ensure that communication will not fail in the case of any emergency?
What kind of communication system do you suggest?
Do you have multiple back up systems in case one or more fail?
What have been some of the consequences due to communication failure in an emergency in a hi-rise?
Over the last seven years, what has been done to increase communication efficiency during emergencies, especially since communication was a major problem in 911 as it is in many other emergencies?
What government agencies do you work with and how does your work coincide with theirs?
What are some complaints you have about buildlings that do no adhere to your standards and are they putting residents and bystanders at risk by failing to be adequately emergency prepared? In what ways?
Please explain in detail how buildings are evaluated?
What are the most important things to take into consideration? height? building material? use of space?
What are the last things that you look at when evaluating a buildling for safety preparedness?
How do you make buildlings safer?
Please give a few examples of typical corrections that need to be made to buildings?
What are the worst problems a buildling can face in terms of safety preparedness?
Tell me about the hardest building to prepare for emergencies versus the easiest kind of buildling?
Who do you have to consult with and what about each person/office makes that person's opinion/expertise/knowledge valuable?
How many buildings have you worked with?
How long does the process take?
Do you recommend that every hi-rise in NYC be evaluated by your company or another one like it?
Why?
What percentage of buildings in NYC do you think are truly prepared for emergencies?
Are most buildings sufficiently prepared before you get to them?
How important is effective communication in the case of an emergency?
How do you ensure that communication will not fail in the case of any emergency?
What kind of communication system do you suggest?
Do you have multiple back up systems in case one or more fail?
What have been some of the consequences due to communication failure in an emergency in a hi-rise?
Over the last seven years, what has been done to increase communication efficiency during emergencies, especially since communication was a major problem in 911 as it is in many other emergencies?
What government agencies do you work with and how does your work coincide with theirs?
What are some complaints you have about buildlings that do no adhere to your standards and are they putting residents and bystanders at risk by failing to be adequately emergency prepared? In what ways?
Two Reports:Employment Practices in Construction Industry
Two solid reports from 2007 relating to employment practices in the NYC construction industry:
“Despite the dangerous working conditions, workers in the underground economy are paid very low wages, are denied the protections of universal social insurance programs (workers’ compensation, unemployment insurance, disability), do not have health coverage or retirement benefits, are not able to join a union, and rarely are they entitled to paid sick leave, holidays or vacations. Working in the underground construction economy is like working in the 19th century when it comes to labor rights, protections and employment standards.”
“New York City and New York State should require prevailing wage for all affordable housing contracts and for any construction project benefiting from city and state government funding, subsidy or zoning or other land use action. Taxpayers get better value with prevailing wage. It is an effective anti-poverty program, and an obvious way to address New York’s widening income gap between the rich and the poor.”
1. Tearing Down Job Quality (Fiscal Policy Institute)
http://www.fiscalpolicy.org/publications2007/FPI_BuildingUpNY_TearingDownJobQuality.pdf
2. Unregulated Work in the Construction Industry (NYU Law School Brennan Center)
http://www.brennancenter.org/page/-/d/download_file_49377.pdf
“Despite the dangerous working conditions, workers in the underground economy are paid very low wages, are denied the protections of universal social insurance programs (workers’ compensation, unemployment insurance, disability), do not have health coverage or retirement benefits, are not able to join a union, and rarely are they entitled to paid sick leave, holidays or vacations. Working in the underground construction economy is like working in the 19th century when it comes to labor rights, protections and employment standards.”
“New York City and New York State should require prevailing wage for all affordable housing contracts and for any construction project benefiting from city and state government funding, subsidy or zoning or other land use action. Taxpayers get better value with prevailing wage. It is an effective anti-poverty program, and an obvious way to address New York’s widening income gap between the rich and the poor.”
Monday, February 25, 2008
A Tale of Three Articles
This is for those of you who wanted to see the evolution of my WSN piece from crappy article to crappier article.
To be publicly embarrassed by teenagers is to feel alive.
To be publicly embarrassed by teenagers is to feel alive.
Falling Debris, the ins and outs (Chad's budget line)
Countless tall buildings in this city. Things are bound to fall from them. The question is, are New Yorkers safe from the construction, crumbling facades, falling tools, etc.? What are the standards of the sidewalk sheds (you know, those structures that separate the falling stuff from your head)? How does the city prosecute violaters of rules dealing with falling debris.? Also, which building in this city has been cited most for falling debris violations and what will it do — or has it done — to remedy the problem?
Sunday, February 24, 2008
fire safety budget line
FIRE SAFETY: WORDS VS. ACTIONS - Galyean
Galyean BUDGET LINEFIRE SAFETY: WORDS VS. ACTIONS: The 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center demonstrated several fatal flaws in fire safety and evacuation procedures in the buildings. Many of these had already been identified in a Congressional report issued in 1995 following the 1993 WTC bombing. Of the nineteen recommendations made in the 1995 report, only a handful were implemented by 2001. The local real estate lobby was largely opposed to most of the safety revisions due to both immediate costs and the potential of lost rental revenue (if floor space was dedicated to escape routes, additional stairwells, etc.).Why were so few of the 1995 recommendations implemented in the WTC and in the subsequent NYC fire safety codes? Is there reasonable evidence to suggest that implementing some of the other recommendations would have saved lives in the 2001 attacks? How is the response to the 2005 report on the 2001 catastrophe following the same pattern?
Posted by Andrea at 8:55 AM
Galyean BUDGET LINEFIRE SAFETY: WORDS VS. ACTIONS: The 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center demonstrated several fatal flaws in fire safety and evacuation procedures in the buildings. Many of these had already been identified in a Congressional report issued in 1995 following the 1993 WTC bombing. Of the nineteen recommendations made in the 1995 report, only a handful were implemented by 2001. The local real estate lobby was largely opposed to most of the safety revisions due to both immediate costs and the potential of lost rental revenue (if floor space was dedicated to escape routes, additional stairwells, etc.).Why were so few of the 1995 recommendations implemented in the WTC and in the subsequent NYC fire safety codes? Is there reasonable evidence to suggest that implementing some of the other recommendations would have saved lives in the 2001 attacks? How is the response to the 2005 report on the 2001 catastrophe following the same pattern?
Posted by Andrea at 8:55 AM
emergency preparedness budget line
Emergency Preparedness Experts: Giegerich's Budget Line
Remlu Inc. is a top emergency preparedness expert company that considers all offices involved in keeping a building safe (corporate management, building staff, and building tenants) when creating preparedness plans for individual buildings. Remlu looks at building structure, possible hazards, staff size, building location, tenant demographics, and local building laws and regulations to create the most effective plan. I plan to profile this company and possibly others like it to learn how each of these components contribute the best safety plan for different types of high-rises in New York City. I will also investigate how necessary companies like Remlu are for safety, how many buildings employ such experts, and if there is a push from the government for high-profile builders, contractors and businesses to at least consider all the aspects of building safety that Remlu does, if not to hire a consulting firm like Remlu.
Posted by Elizabeth at 9:00 AM
Remlu Inc. is a top emergency preparedness expert company that considers all offices involved in keeping a building safe (corporate management, building staff, and building tenants) when creating preparedness plans for individual buildings. Remlu looks at building structure, possible hazards, staff size, building location, tenant demographics, and local building laws and regulations to create the most effective plan. I plan to profile this company and possibly others like it to learn how each of these components contribute the best safety plan for different types of high-rises in New York City. I will also investigate how necessary companies like Remlu are for safety, how many buildings employ such experts, and if there is a push from the government for high-profile builders, contractors and businesses to at least consider all the aspects of building safety that Remlu does, if not to hire a consulting firm like Remlu.
Posted by Elizabeth at 9:00 AM
construction and corruption budget line
Construction and Corruption (VOIEN)
The "building boom" that has occurred in Manhattan since 2003 has strained an already corrupt system of construction regulation and enforcement. I will highlight the involvement of unions and the mob in construction. I will investigate the resultant illegal construction and how it effects building codes. I will address matters of jurisdiction, union politics, and bureaucratic mishandling on the part of the city, and what impact these factors have on how construction regulation is enforced.
Posted by Guelda Voien at 9:26 AM
The "building boom" that has occurred in Manhattan since 2003 has strained an already corrupt system of construction regulation and enforcement. I will highlight the involvement of unions and the mob in construction. I will investigate the resultant illegal construction and how it effects building codes. I will address matters of jurisdiction, union politics, and bureaucratic mishandling on the part of the city, and what impact these factors have on how construction regulation is enforced.
Posted by Guelda Voien at 9:26 AM
High rise residential budget line
High Rise Residential Building Evacuations
HIGH-RISE RESIDENTIAL BUILDING EVACUATIONS (Tressler) If the city of New York does not require residential buildings to have an emergency evacuation plan, how do high-rise residences in New York City plan for an emergency on their own?
The standards that commercial buildings have to meet are nil for residential buildings, regardless of the number of floors the building has. With so many high-rise residences in the city, how do residential building managers ensure the safety of the buildings’ occupants in the event of an emergency?
Posted by SarahTea at 9:33 AM
HIGH-RISE RESIDENTIAL BUILDING EVACUATIONS (Tressler) If the city of New York does not require residential buildings to have an emergency evacuation plan, how do high-rise residences in New York City plan for an emergency on their own?
The standards that commercial buildings have to meet are nil for residential buildings, regardless of the number of floors the building has. With so many high-rise residences in the city, how do residential building managers ensure the safety of the buildings’ occupants in the event of an emergency?
Posted by SarahTea at 9:33 AM
Scaffold Law budget line
Friday, February 22, 2008
SCAFFOLD LAW (Steagall)
Construction incidents on high rises are up, including fatal falls, and day laborers comprise a significant number of these falls. Efforts to keep workers safe on scaffolds include outreach events which distribute safety information to workers in multiple languages, but there is little beyond that. General contractors are not licensed by the city (something recently addressed, which I'll track), so there is no way to keep tabs on the most common offenders. Many pro-business types are attempting to repeal section 240 of the Labor Law, known as the Scaffold Law, and Spitzer has vowed to address it.How is the safety of scaffolding in the city? How effective and frequent are these outreach events? What shape will the new section 240 of the Labor Law take? Is it possible to track general contractors by their scaffolding? How are workers trained and accommodated on scaffolds at places like Deutsche Bank, where extremely intricate scaffolds are being used?
Posted by *lgs at 9:25 AM
0 comments:
SCAFFOLD LAW (Steagall)
Construction incidents on high rises are up, including fatal falls, and day laborers comprise a significant number of these falls. Efforts to keep workers safe on scaffolds include outreach events which distribute safety information to workers in multiple languages, but there is little beyond that. General contractors are not licensed by the city (something recently addressed, which I'll track), so there is no way to keep tabs on the most common offenders. Many pro-business types are attempting to repeal section 240 of the Labor Law, known as the Scaffold Law, and Spitzer has vowed to address it.How is the safety of scaffolding in the city? How effective and frequent are these outreach events? What shape will the new section 240 of the Labor Law take? Is it possible to track general contractors by their scaffolding? How are workers trained and accommodated on scaffolds at places like Deutsche Bank, where extremely intricate scaffolds are being used?
Posted by *lgs at 9:25 AM
0 comments:
Friday, February 22, 2008
AIR QUALITY UPDATE
AIR QUALITY UPDATE (Mike Weiss)Who is responsible for monitoring and alerting, and has this improved after 9/11?The 9/11 air quality issue at the time of the attack arose because (1) building materials (primarily asbestos) had been used in the Towers’ construction and (2) right after the attack there was confusion between government agencies as to who was responsible for monitoring and alerting people about air quality hazards.1. So far, there doesn’t seem to have been any news about improving building materials standards (which materials are safer during a disaster, as well as during demolition and construction). The use of asbestos was outlawed just after the construction of the Twin Towers, and there doesn’t seem to have been any other toxic contaminants that were found during 9/11 which then led to use restrictions. Instead, this aspect of the story has shifted to the cleaning of the asbestos-laden residue from 9/11 which still covers buildings downtown.2. Right after 9/11, many observers feel that the Federal EPA and OSHA should have stepped forward and centralized efforts to immediately issue accurate air quality alerts, and to then coordinate all government agencies’ activities during the clean up. Further, once in this position a centralized authority would have been able to oversee the construction boom that is happening in Lower Manhattan (35 new buildings since 9/11, 68 currently in the works) in order to monitor and alert people about air conditions.This didn’t happen. For various reasons, seemingly stemming from Mayor Giuliani’s insistence that City government and the City agency DDC (Dept. of Design and Construction) oversee all 9/11 building issues, there is now no central authority accountable for air quality issues. Instead, there is a mix of City, State, and Federal agencies which are performing various regulatory roles they were used to performing from before 9/11, but in the post-9/11 world it is unclear what their formal responsibilities are, what they are responsible to report and who they need to report to.To sum up, the issue of air quality standards and how they may have been improved after 9/11 seems to focus on alerting procedures. This means how have procedures improved which will alert people better next time in the event of an emergency, and also who is monitoring and alerting people about the current air quality relating to the post-9/11 demolition and construction boom.
Memo re Deutsche Bank Deconstruction/Investigation
Memo
To: Scaffolding
From: Joy Wiltermuth
Date: February 21, 2001
Re: Deutsche Bank Deconstruction/Investigation
____________________________________
Timeline of major events:
September 11, 2001:
To: Scaffolding
From: Joy Wiltermuth
Date: February 21, 2001
Re: Deutsche Bank Deconstruction/Investigation
____________________________________
Timeline of major events:
September 11, 2001:
130 Liberty Street building (the former Deutsche Bank Building) badly damaged in terrorist attacks in lower Manhattan
August 18, 2007:
August 18, 2007:
Fire breaks out at 130 Liberty Street and firefighters Robert Beddia and Joseph Graffagnino are killed fighting the blaze.
September 8, 2007:
September 8, 2007:
Fire Chiefs say 15-day inspection schedule is not realistic. Bloomberg said it is checking into whether or not other large buildings (in construction or deconstruction) are meeting the 15-day inspection schedule. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/14/nyregion/14deutsche.html?_r=1&scp=9&sq=deutsche+bank+fire&st=nyt&oref=slogin
September 2008:
September 2008:
The statement said Mr. Naftalis and his firm had been retained to help city lawyers respond to the storm of subpoenas issued by the office of Robert M. Morgenthau, the Manhattan district attorney, to advise the city and “to appropriately and fully cooperate” with the inquiry.
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/19/nyregion/19bank.html?scp=6&sq=deutsche+bank+fire&st=nyt
October 9, 2007:
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/19/nyregion/19bank.html?scp=6&sq=deutsche+bank+fire&st=nyt
October 9, 2007:
Uniformed Firefighters Association, the union representing city firefighters and officers, are alleging a cover-up. The union presidents cited two high-level meetings in mid-September at which, they said, two senior chiefs called for a cessation of e-mail messages about the [Deutsche Bank] building.
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/10/nyregion/10fire.html?scp=4&sq=deutsche+bank+fire&st=nyt
January 14, 2008:
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/10/nyregion/10fire.html?scp=4&sq=deutsche+bank+fire&st=nyt
January 14, 2008:
Fire Department alters its inspection schedule. In an effort to focus on larger and more complex construction and demolition projects, the Fire Department has decreased the frequency of inspections for some smaller projects. The move is part of a series of changes made in response to lapses exposed by the death of two firefighters at the former Deutsche Bank building. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/14/nyregion/14inspect.html?scp=8&sq=deutsche+bank+fire&st=nyt
February 14, 2008:
February 14, 2008:
Sister of firefighter killed at Deutsche Bank sues LMDC and contractor at the site who “knowingly created those conditions.” “They had a responsibility to let the firefighters know, and they failed to do that.”
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/14/nyregion/14deutsche.html?_r=1&scp=9&sq=deutsche+bank+fire&st=nyt&oref=slogin
February 20, 2008:
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/14/nyregion/14deutsche.html?_r=1&scp=9&sq=deutsche+bank+fire&st=nyt&oref=slogin
February 20, 2008:
Federal safety regulators have accused the contractors who were taking down the former Deutsche Bank tower in the summer of indifference or intentional disregard for dangerous conditions that led to a fatal fire there, and of a host of other serious safety violations, officials said on Tuesday.
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/20/nyregion/20deutsche.html?scp=7&sq=deutsche+bank+fire&st=nyt
February 21, 2008:
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/20/nyregion/20deutsche.html?scp=7&sq=deutsche+bank+fire&st=nyt
February 21, 2008:
The Bloomberg administration and the state-run Lower Manhattan Development Corporation, both under scrutiny in the criminal investigation into the fatal Deutsche Bank fire, have incurred more than $2.2 million in fees for outside lawyers to defend their roles in the events that led up to the blaze, officials said this week.
The Bloomberg administration and the state-run Lower Manhattan Development Corporation, both under scrutiny in the criminal investigation into the fatal Deutsche Bank fire, have incurred more than $2.2 million in fees for outside lawyers to defend their roles in the events that led up to the blaze, officials said this week.
The Bloomberg administration and the state-run Lower Manhattan Development Corporation, both under scrutiny in the criminal investigation into the fatal Deutsche Bank fire, have incurred more than $2.2 million in fees for outside lawyers to defend their roles in the events that led up to the blaze, officials said this week.
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/21/nyregion/21deutsche.html?scp=2&sq=deutsche+bank+fire&st=nyt
Major players:
1. The Lower Manhattan Development Corporation, which owns the building
2. Bovis Lend Lease, construction manager
3. John Galt Corporation, the subcontractor
4. Robert M. Morgenthau, the Manhattan district attorney
5. Uniformed Firefighters Association
6. Dept of Buildings DOB
Major players:
1. The Lower Manhattan Development Corporation, which owns the building
2. Bovis Lend Lease, construction manager
3. John Galt Corporation, the subcontractor
4. Robert M. Morgenthau, the Manhattan district attorney
5. Uniformed Firefighters Association
6. Dept of Buildings DOB
High Rise Residential Building Evacuations
HIGH-RISE RESIDENTIAL BUILDING EVACUATIONS (Tressler) If the city of
Construction and Corruption (VOIEN)
The "building boom" that has occurred in Manhattan since 2003 has strained an already corrupt system of construction regulation and enforcement. I will highlight the involvement of unions and the mob in construction. I will investigate the resultant illegal construction and how it effects building codes. I will address matters of jurisdiction, union politics, and bureaucratic mishandling on the part of the city, and what impact these factors have on how construction regulation is enforced.
SCAFFOLD LAW (Steagall)
Construction incidents on high rises are up, including fatal falls, and day laborers comprise a significant number of these falls. Efforts to keep workers safe on scaffolds include outreach events which distribute safety information to workers in multiple languages, but there is little beyond that. General contractors are not licensed by the city (something recently addressed, which I'll track), so there is no way to keep tabs on the most common offenders. Many pro-business types are attempting to repeal section 240 of the Labor Law, known as the Scaffold Law, and Spitzer has vowed to address it.
How is the safety of scaffolding in the city? How effective and frequent are these outreach events? What shape will the new section 240 of the Labor Law take? Is it possible to track general contractors by their scaffolding? How are workers trained and accommodated on scaffolds at places like Deutsche Bank, where extremely intricate scaffolds are being used?
How is the safety of scaffolding in the city? How effective and frequent are these outreach events? What shape will the new section 240 of the Labor Law take? Is it possible to track general contractors by their scaffolding? How are workers trained and accommodated on scaffolds at places like Deutsche Bank, where extremely intricate scaffolds are being used?
Deutsche Bank, The Smoking Gun
DEUTSCHE BANK (Joy Wiltermuth) It was badly damaged on September 11, 2001 and acquired by the Lower Manhattan Development Corporation to undertake its deconstruction. In August of 2007, a fire broke out at the site killing two firefighters and Morgenthau’s office quickly opened an investigation. Deconstruction has been halted amidst allegations of building code violations, negligence and corruption. Meanwhile, the city and the LMDC have retained prestigious criminal defense firms to deal with Morgenthau’s broadening inquiry and it is still uncertain under what conditions, demolition of the former Deutsche Bank would recommence. Are current building inspection plan realistic, safe or viable in light of the city’s construction boom?
[Budget Line] UN Profile (Kim)
UN RENOVATION(Kim) I'm planning to do a profile of the UN renovation process, a $1.88 billion rehabilitation project, called "Capital Master plan". But would that be achieved? Is there any criticism on this plan? Is there anything missing? This will focus the aspects on security, environmental and safety issues. A recent UN staff report estimates that the project will achieve a 40% reduction in energy consumption and the renovation also entails installation of blast-resistant glass curtain wall that will have double or triple glazing.
NON-UNION WORKERS (Gariiiiiiiiib)
NON-UNION WORKERS (Gariiiiiiib) The Laborers' Union, which is behind most large-scale construction projects in the city, and the Builders' Association, which represents developers, both say that non-union work sites cause far more accidents than union sites. But these organizations have interests in not only maintaining safety at construction sites, but squeezing out lower-paid non-union workers, many of whom are undocumented workers, who are their main competition.
These organizations have close relationships with the Department of Buildings and contribute heavily to new regulations. They have little interest in large-scale regulations changes that better incorporate safety requirements in all jobs uniformly because the costs would disproportionately fall on union jobs. Rather, they prefer small, piecemeal changes that don't put the burden on them all at one time.
The Department of Buildings has so far seemed quite obliging, preferring small changes in reaction to crises (such as the 2006 death of Ramiro Jara). But why? Why are immigrant groups and politicians like Councilmember Rosie Mendez (district 2, Housing & Buildings cttee) upset at the pace and scope of new regulations?
These organizations have close relationships with the Department of Buildings and contribute heavily to new regulations. They have little interest in large-scale regulations changes that better incorporate safety requirements in all jobs uniformly because the costs would disproportionately fall on union jobs. Rather, they prefer small, piecemeal changes that don't put the burden on them all at one time.
The Department of Buildings has so far seemed quite obliging, preferring small changes in reaction to crises (such as the 2006 death of Ramiro Jara). But why? Why are immigrant groups and politicians like Councilmember Rosie Mendez (district 2, Housing & Buildings cttee) upset at the pace and scope of new regulations?
GREEN BUILDING (Carlson)
GREEN BUILDING (Carlson) Are green buildings practical in an age of terrorism? What efforts are being made to integrate sustainable architecture approaches with New York City’s post-9/11 building and fire codes? In a time when global warming is a hot-button issue and considering 80 percent of carbon emissions comes from buildings, the City has mandated that new building and major alteration be designed according to certain green design standards. Mayor Bloomberg’s PlaNYC identifies green building as an opportunity to capitalize on innovative sustainable practices. What measures are in place to ensure that green buildings comply with building and fire code regulations? This piece will be narrowed as the reporting progresses, however the following facets of this issue will likely be discussed: City-issued economic incentives, LEED certification (Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design), the Freedom Tower as a Gold standard building, straw insulation, refrigeration/air conditioning equipment, and recycled construction materials.
Emergency Preparedness Experts: Giegerich's Budget Line
Remlu Inc. is a top emergency preparedness expert company that considers all offices involved in keeping a building safe (corporate management, building staff, and building tenants) when creating preparedness plans for individual buildings. Remlu looks at building structure, possible hazards, staff size, building location, tenant demographics, and local building laws and regulations to create the most effective plan. I plan to profile this company and possibly others like it to learn how each of these components contribute the best safety plan for different types of high-rises in New York City. I will also investigate how necessary companies like Remlu are for safety, how many buildings employ such experts, and if there is a push from the government for high-profile builders, contractors and businesses to at least consider all the aspects of building safety that Remlu does, if not to hire a consulting firm like Remlu.
History: Safety and the Bottom Line
BUDGET LINE:
Changes in New York City building code meant to make life in high-rises here safer have followed disasters like a devastating 1911 fire that claimed about 150 lives and the Sept. 11 attacks. But economic concerns have had a similarly substantial impact on high-rise construction and maintenance. Often, the two concerns – economic and safety – clash. With the memories of Sept. 11 still fresh, the history of how building construction has evolved in the world’s tallest city can help explain how safe skyscrapers here are now, if many are still vulnerable, and why.
Changes in New York City building code meant to make life in high-rises here safer have followed disasters like a devastating 1911 fire that claimed about 150 lives and the Sept. 11 attacks. But economic concerns have had a similarly substantial impact on high-rise construction and maintenance. Often, the two concerns – economic and safety – clash. With the memories of Sept. 11 still fresh, the history of how building construction has evolved in the world’s tallest city can help explain how safe skyscrapers here are now, if many are still vulnerable, and why.
FIRE SAFETY: WORDS VS. ACTIONS - Galyean
Galyean BUDGET LINE
FIRE SAFETY: WORDS VS. ACTIONS: The 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center demonstrated several fatal flaws in fire safety and evacuation procedures in the buildings. Many of these had already been identified in a Congressional report issued in 1995 following the 1993 WTC bombing. Of the nineteen recommendations made in the 1995 report, only a handful were implemented by 2001. The local real estate lobby was largely opposed to most of the safety revisions due to both immediate costs and the potential of lost rental revenue (if floor space was dedicated to escape routes, additional stairwells, etc.).
Why were so few of the 1995 recommendations implemented in the WTC and in the subsequent NYC fire safety codes? Is there reasonable evidence to suggest that implementing some of the other recommendations would have saved lives in the 2001 attacks? Is the response to the 2005 report on the 2001 catastrophe following the same pattern?
FIRE SAFETY: WORDS VS. ACTIONS: The 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center demonstrated several fatal flaws in fire safety and evacuation procedures in the buildings. Many of these had already been identified in a Congressional report issued in 1995 following the 1993 WTC bombing. Of the nineteen recommendations made in the 1995 report, only a handful were implemented by 2001. The local real estate lobby was largely opposed to most of the safety revisions due to both immediate costs and the potential of lost rental revenue (if floor space was dedicated to escape routes, additional stairwells, etc.).
Why were so few of the 1995 recommendations implemented in the WTC and in the subsequent NYC fire safety codes? Is there reasonable evidence to suggest that implementing some of the other recommendations would have saved lives in the 2001 attacks? Is the response to the 2005 report on the 2001 catastrophe following the same pattern?
Design for Safety: Parkins' Budget Line
After the World Trade Center collapse, a number of questions on the quality of the building design arose- what could have made the building stronger? Is it possible to build a safer skyscraper today? What about the skyscrapers that already exist?
Architects and engineers have been contemplating the same thing and have been developing techniques in the years since to not only construct taller towers but to make them safer as well. Wind, fire and evacuation are three of the top concerns that architects and engineers have been testing out- sometimes to great effect.
But are their techniques too far-fetched and expensive for cities to adopt? How will they influence building codes? Will they ever know how safe their designs are without the ultimate test of calamity?
This article will explore the design elements that architects and engineers have been testing in skyscraper developments in New York since September 11 and the feasibility on the city level of adopting the techniques. Is the city open to them? Is it a priority? How are they working together to make skyscrapers safer?
Architects and engineers have been contemplating the same thing and have been developing techniques in the years since to not only construct taller towers but to make them safer as well. Wind, fire and evacuation are three of the top concerns that architects and engineers have been testing out- sometimes to great effect.
But are their techniques too far-fetched and expensive for cities to adopt? How will they influence building codes? Will they ever know how safe their designs are without the ultimate test of calamity?
This article will explore the design elements that architects and engineers have been testing in skyscraper developments in New York since September 11 and the feasibility on the city level of adopting the techniques. Is the city open to them? Is it a priority? How are they working together to make skyscrapers safer?
Giambusso Budget Line
WHO'S PAYING ATTENTION? (Giambusso): In the rush to build new housing, stores, and community spaces are politicians and developers ignoring important safety precautions? Environmentalists, safety experts and advocacy groups have called for caution in the rush to build, but their voices are often drowned out by business friendly city agencies and political leaders eager to point to construction as a sign of progress. Only six years after 9/11 what lessons have we learned about building safety and environmental impact? Are those lessons being heeded by our political leaders? Through an examination of specific sites targeted for development, the piece will examine the political battles and interplay between pressure groups that brought these sites to bear.
Air Quality
Post 9/11 Air Quality regulations (Mike Weiss)
Who is responsible for monitoring and alerting, and has this improved after 9/11?
The 9/11 air quality issue at the time of the attack arose because (1) building materials (primarily asbestos) had been used in the Towers’ construction and (2) right after the attack there was confusion between government agencies as to who was responsible for monitoring and alerting people about air quality hazards.
1. So far, there doesn’t seem to have been any news about improving building materials standards (which materials are safer during a disater, as well as during demolition and construction). The use of asbestos was outlawed just after the construction of the Twin Towers, and there doesn’t seem to have been any other toxic contaminants that were found during 9/11 which then led to use restrictions. Instead, this aspect of the story has shifted to the cleaning of the asbestos-laden residue from 9/11 which still covers buildings downtown.
2. Right after 9/11, many observers feel that the Federal EPA and OSHA should have stepped forward and centralized efforts to immediately issue accurate air quality alerts, and to then coordinate all government agencies’ activities during the clean up. Further, once in this position a centralized authorithy would have been able to oversee the construction boom that is happening in Lower Manhattan (35 new buildings since 9/11, 68 currently in the works) in order to monitor and alert people about air conditions.
This didn’t happen. For various reasons, seemingly stemming from Mayor Giuliani’s insistance that City government and the City agency DDC (Dept. of Design and Construction) oversee all 9/11 building issues, there is now no central authority accountable for air quality issues. Instead, there is a mix of City, State, and Federal agencies which are performing various regulatory roles they were used to performing from before 9/11, but in the post-9/11 world it is unclear what their formal responsibilities are, what they are responsible to report and who they need to report to.
To sum up, the issue of air quality standards and how they may have been improved after 9/11 seems to focus on alerting procedures. This means how have procedures improved which will alert people better next time in the event of an emergency, and also who is monitoring and alerting people about the current air quality relating to the post-9/11 demolition and construction boom.
Who is responsible for monitoring and alerting, and has this improved after 9/11?
The 9/11 air quality issue at the time of the attack arose because (1) building materials (primarily asbestos) had been used in the Towers’ construction and (2) right after the attack there was confusion between government agencies as to who was responsible for monitoring and alerting people about air quality hazards.
1. So far, there doesn’t seem to have been any news about improving building materials standards (which materials are safer during a disater, as well as during demolition and construction). The use of asbestos was outlawed just after the construction of the Twin Towers, and there doesn’t seem to have been any other toxic contaminants that were found during 9/11 which then led to use restrictions. Instead, this aspect of the story has shifted to the cleaning of the asbestos-laden residue from 9/11 which still covers buildings downtown.
2. Right after 9/11, many observers feel that the Federal EPA and OSHA should have stepped forward and centralized efforts to immediately issue accurate air quality alerts, and to then coordinate all government agencies’ activities during the clean up. Further, once in this position a centralized authorithy would have been able to oversee the construction boom that is happening in Lower Manhattan (35 new buildings since 9/11, 68 currently in the works) in order to monitor and alert people about air conditions.
This didn’t happen. For various reasons, seemingly stemming from Mayor Giuliani’s insistance that City government and the City agency DDC (Dept. of Design and Construction) oversee all 9/11 building issues, there is now no central authority accountable for air quality issues. Instead, there is a mix of City, State, and Federal agencies which are performing various regulatory roles they were used to performing from before 9/11, but in the post-9/11 world it is unclear what their formal responsibilities are, what they are responsible to report and who they need to report to.
To sum up, the issue of air quality standards and how they may have been improved after 9/11 seems to focus on alerting procedures. This means how have procedures improved which will alert people better next time in the event of an emergency, and also who is monitoring and alerting people about the current air quality relating to the post-9/11 demolition and construction boom.
Building Design and Safety
I will be looking at skyscraper construction and safety considerations in their engineering and design.
Here are some articles that discuss how the World Trade Center's design and engineering contributed to the collapse of the towers.
USA Today: High Rises Remain Vulnerable After 9-11
New York Times: A Nation Challenged - Building Design, Report Sees Lower Towers That Can Empty Faster
Three important issues stood out from the article research:
Building Owners and Managers Association
Council on Tall Buildings and Urban Habitat
Kohn Pederson Fox Architects
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Other sources of information on skyscraper design and safety:
Fire/Safety Building and Design- The Safety Library (also a good site for disaster safety, emergency management, terrorism, etc.)
Here are some articles that discuss how the World Trade Center's design and engineering contributed to the collapse of the towers.
USA Today: High Rises Remain Vulnerable After 9-11
New York Times: A Nation Challenged - Building Design, Report Sees Lower Towers That Can Empty Faster
Three important issues stood out from the article research:
- Until June 2007, no fire or safety tests were done for multiple floors in skyscrapers, to see how materials would stand up to heat. The primary reason these tests were not done was cost.
- Cost, is a factor again when thinking of protecting existing skyscrapers from a similar fate. It is relatively inexpensive in new construction to use better flame retardant materials however it becomes prohibitively expensive to upgrade existing buildings. The policy so far has been to grandfather older buildings instead of bringing them up to code.
- Since building code changes could takes years, engineering and design firms help draft model codes for use locally to help developers, cities, designers, etc. react quickly to current flaws in engineering and design.
- What engineering and design methods are being considered in skyscraper construction in the United States and overseas to facilitate mass evacuations
- Case studies in the United States, Middle East (Dubai in particular where skyscrapers are being built larger and faster with the newest engineering techniques) and Asia (Kuala Lumpur and China especially).
- Which materials can withstand heat, wind and fire on multiple levels in skyscrapers (what is being used currently and what is being considered and why)
- Alternatives to common engineering techniques
- Landscape Architecture considerations for safety and evacuation from tall buildings
- Expert opinions from architects and engineers
Building Owners and Managers Association
Council on Tall Buildings and Urban Habitat
Kohn Pederson Fox Architects
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Other sources of information on skyscraper design and safety:
Fire/Safety Building and Design- The Safety Library (also a good site for disaster safety, emergency management, terrorism, etc.)
Thursday, February 21, 2008
History
Major revisions of the New York City building code have come largely as the result of tragedy or economic concerns. In 1911, about 150 workers at the Triangle Shirtwaist factory died in a fire, prompting major changes that can be researched beyond the Cornell link below. The changes in 1937 and 1968 were mainly the result of builders complaining about the price to build here. We are in the fourth phase of code upheaval, obviously as the result of the attacks on Sept. 11, 2001.
History shows that safety often competes with bottom-line concerns in reshaping New York City building codes. Media reports show arguments in 2004 between members of the building community hoping to save money and others worried more about the safety of the building. In 1968, the debates were similar. Here’s a quote from a 2002 New York Times story referencing the building code revisions in 1968.
''With the old buildings, you know the building's going to hold,'' said Neil P. Winberry, a retired New York fire captain. ''You've got time to work.'' After the city fire code was changed in 1968, allowing a widespread shift from masonry fireproofing to a light, spray-on product, Mr. Winberry said, ''we could not understand how this was going to work; we had no faith in it.'
The debates are normally very polarizing so I wouldn’t jump to the conclusion that these builders are ignoring safety precautions. Many of the reports beyond the links below should give us some sources to contact, which I plan to begin doing next week. I am going to focus mostly on the history of code changes, why they come about and what the real changes have been.
Obviously not knowing much yet, here is a rough version of a potential budget line:
Changes in New York City building code meant to make life in high-rises here safer have followed disasters like a devastating 1911 fire that claimed about 150 lives and the Sept. 11 attacks. But economic concerns have had a similarly substantial impact on high-rise construction and maintenance. Often, the two concerns – economic and safety – clash. With the memories of Sept. 11 still fresh, the history of how building construction has evolved in the world’s tallest city can help explain how safe skyscrapers here are now, if many are still vulnerable, and why.
Below are links to many New York Times reports on the subject. The first two get into the history of the subject. The third seems to be written by an expert on a site I didn’t recognize but it’s amazingly interesting, expecially from the historical perspective and why things are the way they are; I’m going to look this guy up and give him a call. The fourth goes to Cornell’s very thorough project about the Triangle fire that includes numerous primary documents. .
Starkey
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F05E2D9143FF934A25756C0A9629C8B63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=3
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9904EEDB123AF931A35757C0A9649C8B63&st=cse&sq=April+2+2002+Lipton&scp=5
http://www.todaysfacilitymanager.com/tfm_02_05_topstory.asp
http://www.ilr.cornell.edu/trianglefire/
Some more Times articles at the time of historic building code revisions here:
http://select.nytimes.com/mem/archive/pdf?res=F00F12FD3D54157493C5A9178AD95F4C8685F9
http://select.nytimes.com/mem/archive/pdf?res=F20C12F73C581B728DDDAF0A94D1405B818AF1D3
http://select.nytimes.com/mem/archive/pdf?res=F40A17F73E54107A93CBA9178CD85F4D8385F9
http://select.nytimes.com/mem/archive/pdf?res=F40716FB3C5D12738DDDAD0894DA415B878FF1D3
History shows that safety often competes with bottom-line concerns in reshaping New York City building codes. Media reports show arguments in 2004 between members of the building community hoping to save money and others worried more about the safety of the building. In 1968, the debates were similar. Here’s a quote from a 2002 New York Times story referencing the building code revisions in 1968.
''With the old buildings, you know the building's going to hold,'' said Neil P. Winberry, a retired New York fire captain. ''You've got time to work.'' After the city fire code was changed in 1968, allowing a widespread shift from masonry fireproofing to a light, spray-on product, Mr. Winberry said, ''we could not understand how this was going to work; we had no faith in it.'
The debates are normally very polarizing so I wouldn’t jump to the conclusion that these builders are ignoring safety precautions. Many of the reports beyond the links below should give us some sources to contact, which I plan to begin doing next week. I am going to focus mostly on the history of code changes, why they come about and what the real changes have been.
Obviously not knowing much yet, here is a rough version of a potential budget line:
Changes in New York City building code meant to make life in high-rises here safer have followed disasters like a devastating 1911 fire that claimed about 150 lives and the Sept. 11 attacks. But economic concerns have had a similarly substantial impact on high-rise construction and maintenance. Often, the two concerns – economic and safety – clash. With the memories of Sept. 11 still fresh, the history of how building construction has evolved in the world’s tallest city can help explain how safe skyscrapers here are now, if many are still vulnerable, and why.
Below are links to many New York Times reports on the subject. The first two get into the history of the subject. The third seems to be written by an expert on a site I didn’t recognize but it’s amazingly interesting, expecially from the historical perspective and why things are the way they are; I’m going to look this guy up and give him a call. The fourth goes to Cornell’s very thorough project about the Triangle fire that includes numerous primary documents. .
Starkey
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F05E2D9143FF934A25756C0A9629C8B63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=3
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9904EEDB123AF931A35757C0A9649C8B63&st=cse&sq=April+2+2002+Lipton&scp=5
http://www.todaysfacilitymanager.com/tfm_02_05_topstory.asp
http://www.ilr.cornell.edu/trianglefire/
Some more Times articles at the time of historic building code revisions here:
http://select.nytimes.com/mem/archive/pdf?res=F00F12FD3D54157493C5A9178AD95F4C8685F9
http://select.nytimes.com/mem/archive/pdf?res=F20C12F73C581B728DDDAF0A94D1405B818AF1D3
http://select.nytimes.com/mem/archive/pdf?res=F40A17F73E54107A93CBA9178CD85F4D8385F9
http://select.nytimes.com/mem/archive/pdf?res=F40716FB3C5D12738DDDAD0894DA415B878FF1D3
Sooyeon's Memo
I'm planning to do a profile of the UN renovation process, a $1.88 billion rehabilitation project.
I researched how the process has been going and figured this whole plan has been delayed too long for bureaucratic reasons, budgeting, looking for temporary building for workers and stuff.
But I expect this profile of the UN will focus the aspects on security, environmental and safety issues. They plan to achieve a LEED Silver rating and there
Also when I looked up news articles in the past, I could not find any criticism or conflict opinions about actual renovation, except the criticism of hight costs.
So I wonder if the plan is perfect. (is it possible?) I have to set up the interview with experts who can give some other opinions about this plan.
****** Brief note **********
They set up the plan called "Capital Master plan,'
That would be a glass-encased Secretariat tower and the General Assembly Building’s main hall which have gotten no major renovations since they opened more than 50 years ago.
The renovation targets include the Secretariat Building built in 1950; the Conference and General Assembly buildings opened in 1951 and 1952; the Dag Hammarskjöld Library, North Lawn Building, and South Annex Building, opened between 1961 and 1982; and the complex’s three-level basement with a parking garage.
Rrenovation also entails installation of new, energy-efficient and blast-resistant glass curtain wall that will have double or triple glazing.
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/28/world/28nations.html
("The glass curtain wall will be replaced by a heavily laminated one that appears identical but is far stronger and able to withstand the blast of a bomb attack.Energy-saving additions include sensors that turn off lights in unoccupied rooms and solar power systems")
http://www.nysun.com/article/67949
(Once the project is completed, "the U.N. headquarters will not only be a safer, healthier, greener, and more secure place, but our renovated workshop for peace will also stand out as a symbol for building a revitalized U.N. for a better world," Secretary-General Ban said in a statement yesterday, thanking members for the approval of the plan.)
http://newyork.construction.com/features/archive/2007/12_feature1.asp
(The renovation program will introduce a full roster of green measures, some tied into broader tasks and others focused on sustainability. A recent UN staff report estimates that the project will achieve a 40% reduction in energy consumption.
The new curtain wall for the 39-story Secretariat Building, modern lighting, and more efficient building systems are examples of needed upgrades that will introduce energy savings. The HVAC systems, for instance, will use no CFC-based refrigerants, while electrical generators may run on biodiesel fuels and plumbing fixtures will use low-flow water technology.)
http://news.bbc.co.uk/player/nol/newsid_7060000/newsid_7065300/7065366.stm?
(video report)
UN(Capital Master plan) (www.un.org/cmp)
UN procurement Division (www.un.eog/depts/ptd)
U.S. government accountability office (www.gao.ov)
Need to contact
-Experts who can give some neutral view of this plan
-Mr Werner Schmidt; Public Information Officer, capital master plan.
Tel. (917) 367-5420Fax (917) 367-5377
Dean Memo
I'm looking into safety gadget patents at the moment. The story is promising. There's been a safety gadget boom since 9-11. Everything from ramps to parachutes are quite lucrative. I'm also looking into emergency handicapped access.
(good article!) Reconstructing New York’s Building Code Overhaul
This is the article about the building cord written in 2007.
Also still there are issue of cost of construction and in turn, increase the cost of housing.
link.
http://www.gothamgazette.com/article/issueoftheweek/20070514/200/2181
Mayor Michael Bloomberg propsed a massive overhaul of the city's building code, the first in nearly 40 years in 2007.
Under the proposed regulations, for example, all new buildings over 55 feet tall, which would include the Bronx home, would be required to have a more fire-resistant stairway, automatic sprinkler systems, and hardwired smoke alarms that sound in every room.Also still there are issue of cost of construction and in turn, increase the cost of housing.
link.
http://www.gothamgazette.com/article/issueoftheweek/20070514/200/2181
New Task Force to inspect construction sites
Manhattan Borough President Scott Stringer announced yesterday the creation of a task force -- the Manhattan Borough Construction Watch -- to inspect and monitor construction sites throughout the city.
On Tuesday, the federal government fined contractors working at the old Deutsche Bank building $464,500 for the safety violations.
On Tuesday, the federal government fined contractors working at the old Deutsche Bank building $464,500 for the safety violations.
Wednesday, February 20, 2008
Writing budget lines
Once you've written a memo re what you're working on, the next step is to write a tentative budget line (see example below), that provides a working title for your story and briefly describes what it's about. If more than one reporter is working on the same topic, do a joint budget line (with last names in parethesis). These can be updated and even refocused as your research progresses. Label your budget lines under "project notes." We'll talk more about this on Friday.
(Example)
WANAQUE DUMP (Barry) Are toxic fumes from an old landfill seeping into the Passaic County Community College building in Wanaque? Environmentalists are raising this question. A previous building was torn down because dangerous levels of methane were rising from the landfill. What is known is that a driver for a Ford hauler says he dumped paint sludge at a landfill in Wanaque, a DEP investigator in the 1980s reported paint and drums in a wooded area behind where the college building is now, and a consultant for the county reported paint in a test pit in the same area. Groundwater and soil were contaminated by lead, PCBs, TCE and other toxic substances as of late 1990s, the last time records show testing was done.
(Example)
WANAQUE DUMP (Barry) Are toxic fumes from an old landfill seeping into the Passaic County Community College building in Wanaque? Environmentalists are raising this question. A previous building was torn down because dangerous levels of methane were rising from the landfill. What is known is that a driver for a Ford hauler says he dumped paint sludge at a landfill in Wanaque, a DEP investigator in the 1980s reported paint and drums in a wooded area behind where the college building is now, and a consultant for the county reported paint in a test pit in the same area. Groundwater and soil were contaminated by lead, PCBs, TCE and other toxic substances as of late 1990s, the last time records show testing was done.
Giambusso Memo
Building Battles:
OVERVIEW:
I am attempting to examine the political battles that go into building and development. I hope to examine specific sites and demonstrate how the pressures of City Council, Congress, developers, community groups etc, shape building safety. I would like to look at a development that has been finished, one that is being constructed and ne that is in the planning stages.
I am looking specifically to examine how the race to develop may be having a deleterious effect on building safety. Politicians and developers are often involved in projects that garner government funds (affordable housing, brownfield development) making enterprises more lucrative for builders.
The question I hope to raise is how safe are these projects, what are the standards and what have been the real-life consequences of projects that perhaps moved too quickly for political economic expediency while ignoring safety standards.
FIRST SITE: Gowanus Canal, “Public Place”
Lede(?)
Along the trendy restaurants of Cobble Hill and the nouveau-chic bars of Park Slope, underneath the lacquered hardwood walkups, where hipsters, yuppies and trustafarians, meet, live, and raise their young, between two lands conquered by the inexorable armies of gentrification, there runs a river of poison--a mile and half of putrid waterway that once served the factories and chemical plants lining its banks.
For over a century the Gowanus Canal has acted as an industrial sewer, suffering the runoff of tanneries, machine shops, and factories churning soap, paint, ink, and sulfur. The waterway, which connects Upper New York Bay to the neighborhoods of Red Hook, South Brooklyn, and Park Slope, runs along a flood basin of toxicity.
In the eyes of politicians, the banks of the Gowanus are a fertile ground for green spaces and affordable housing. In the eyes of developers, the Gowanus valley is a gold prospect promising government funding and quick profits. For the starry-eyed denizens of the outlying neighborhoods, the land along the Gowanus is another chance to recreate the city’s landscape in their own image--complete with coffee shops, dog runs, and tree lined walkways through which to push the seemingly endless stream of baby carriages that follows the march of young urban affluence.
In the fever to develop this infamous stretch, though, some in the community have raised the unwelcome flag of caution and warned that we may not know exactly what has been created underneath these banks. There is skepticism that a layer of sod and some shrubberies may only mask the feet of sledge and chemical waste that have built up over the last one hundred years. Some warn that the consequences of living among these noxious deposits may be dire…
SECOND SITE: Atlantic Yards
THIRD SITE:
LINKS:
http://www.brooklyneagle.com/categories/category.php?category_id=5&id=18585
http://www.brooklyneagle.com/categories/category.php?category_id=27&id=18300
http://www.gowanus.org/gowanus.htm
http://www.waterfrontmuseum.org/dredgers/links/voice.html
http://www.gowanusartists.com/home.html
http://www.plannyc.org/project-75-Gowanus-Development
CONTACT:
Jessica Pozzuoli: Television Producer, Environmental Activist, Urban Planner
Sarah Ryley: Reporter, Brooklyn Daily Eagle
Bill deBlasio, NYCity Council
David Yassky, NYC Council
Jim Brennan, NYS Assembly
Nydia Velazquez, U.S. House of Reps, 11th District. (The fightin 11th!)
Toll Brothers Development Co.
A.J. Carter, press person at the Empire State Development Corporation
Bob Zuckerman, GCCDC
Patricia Culligan, Professor Engineering Mechanics at Columbia University
NYC D of Buildings
DEP
Seth Donlin, spokesman, Department of Housing Preservation and Development (NYC DHPD)
Bette Stoltz, executive director of the South Brooklyn Local Development Corporation (SBLDC)
TO DO:
GOWANUS
• Get a copy of Culligan’s report/conduct interviews to learn what clean up methods are used in brownfields.
• Also from Culligan, where else have cleanup methods been used and what have been the consequences.
• Contact policymakers, agencies, advocates to determine who is pro, who is against Public Place (GCCDC, SBLDC, EDC, NYS DEP, HPD, D of B, Yassky, Brennan, Velazquez)
• Determine how much Public Place will cost: cleanup, design, construction commercial rent, residential rent, government funding
• Visit other Toll Brothers sites. Do they usually flip brown fields? What do residents say of their developments what is their reputation, who are the architects?
• Visit sites listed in Culligan’s report
OVERVIEW:
I am attempting to examine the political battles that go into building and development. I hope to examine specific sites and demonstrate how the pressures of City Council, Congress, developers, community groups etc, shape building safety. I would like to look at a development that has been finished, one that is being constructed and ne that is in the planning stages.
I am looking specifically to examine how the race to develop may be having a deleterious effect on building safety. Politicians and developers are often involved in projects that garner government funds (affordable housing, brownfield development) making enterprises more lucrative for builders.
The question I hope to raise is how safe are these projects, what are the standards and what have been the real-life consequences of projects that perhaps moved too quickly for political economic expediency while ignoring safety standards.
FIRST SITE: Gowanus Canal, “Public Place”
Lede(?)
Along the trendy restaurants of Cobble Hill and the nouveau-chic bars of Park Slope, underneath the lacquered hardwood walkups, where hipsters, yuppies and trustafarians, meet, live, and raise their young, between two lands conquered by the inexorable armies of gentrification, there runs a river of poison--a mile and half of putrid waterway that once served the factories and chemical plants lining its banks.
For over a century the Gowanus Canal has acted as an industrial sewer, suffering the runoff of tanneries, machine shops, and factories churning soap, paint, ink, and sulfur. The waterway, which connects Upper New York Bay to the neighborhoods of Red Hook, South Brooklyn, and Park Slope, runs along a flood basin of toxicity.
In the eyes of politicians, the banks of the Gowanus are a fertile ground for green spaces and affordable housing. In the eyes of developers, the Gowanus valley is a gold prospect promising government funding and quick profits. For the starry-eyed denizens of the outlying neighborhoods, the land along the Gowanus is another chance to recreate the city’s landscape in their own image--complete with coffee shops, dog runs, and tree lined walkways through which to push the seemingly endless stream of baby carriages that follows the march of young urban affluence.
In the fever to develop this infamous stretch, though, some in the community have raised the unwelcome flag of caution and warned that we may not know exactly what has been created underneath these banks. There is skepticism that a layer of sod and some shrubberies may only mask the feet of sledge and chemical waste that have built up over the last one hundred years. Some warn that the consequences of living among these noxious deposits may be dire…
SECOND SITE: Atlantic Yards
THIRD SITE:
LINKS:
http://www.brooklyneagle.com/categories/category.php?category_id=5&id=18585
http://www.brooklyneagle.com/categories/category.php?category_id=27&id=18300
http://www.gowanus.org/gowanus.htm
http://www.waterfrontmuseum.org/dredgers/links/voice.html
http://www.gowanusartists.com/home.html
http://www.plannyc.org/project-75-Gowanus-Development
CONTACT:
Jessica Pozzuoli: Television Producer, Environmental Activist, Urban Planner
Sarah Ryley: Reporter, Brooklyn Daily Eagle
Bill deBlasio, NYCity Council
David Yassky, NYC Council
Jim Brennan, NYS Assembly
Nydia Velazquez, U.S. House of Reps, 11th District. (The fightin 11th!)
Toll Brothers Development Co.
A.J. Carter, press person at the Empire State Development Corporation
Bob Zuckerman, GCCDC
Patricia Culligan, Professor Engineering Mechanics at Columbia University
NYC D of Buildings
DEP
Seth Donlin, spokesman, Department of Housing Preservation and Development (NYC DHPD)
Bette Stoltz, executive director of the South Brooklyn Local Development Corporation (SBLDC)
TO DO:
GOWANUS
• Get a copy of Culligan’s report/conduct interviews to learn what clean up methods are used in brownfields.
• Also from Culligan, where else have cleanup methods been used and what have been the consequences.
• Contact policymakers, agencies, advocates to determine who is pro, who is against Public Place (GCCDC, SBLDC, EDC, NYS DEP, HPD, D of B, Yassky, Brennan, Velazquez)
• Determine how much Public Place will cost: cleanup, design, construction commercial rent, residential rent, government funding
• Visit other Toll Brothers sites. Do they usually flip brown fields? What do residents say of their developments what is their reputation, who are the architects?
• Visit sites listed in Culligan’s report
memo.
I think I need to request, or make myself? a link/tab/label for Communication and Hi-Rise (Fire) Safety.
I am looking into outdated, un-enforced safety procedures and codes in high-rise buildings. Many buildings need to update their fire alarms and procedures. How effective are radios in the case of a fire? The FDNY has begun using a new radio called UHF portable radios. How are they working out? What is the procedure when a fire alarm fails to sound, how do people know to evacuate the building? How effective is knocking on residents doors in the middle of the night at saving people from smoke and fire?
Talk to NY Fire Department to learn about UHF, standard procedure, problems they face and prospective solutions.
-How quick is arrival of fire trucks? Is it quick enough?
NYFD – Nicholas Scoppetta – Commissioner of Fire Department or
Department of City Planning- Amanda M. Burden – Chair of City Planning Commission
What is a typical cause of fire and what is done to help prevent them from starting? To educate people on the problem?
Tips from FDNY website:
http://www.nyc.gov/html/fdny/html/units/fire_prevention/fire_prev_forms.shtml
Bureau of Fire Prevention:
http://www.nyc.gov/html/fdny/html/units/fire_prevention/fire_prev_index.shtml
National Fire Protection Association: 617-984-7275
NYC Dept. of Buildings Commissioner – Patricia Lancaster – 212-566-3473
What do “emergency preparedness experts” look at when evaluating a building’s situation? What factors vary from building to building that require different hi-rises to have different preparedness plans? How many buildings participate in such screenings and how effective are they?
Talk to Walter Ulmer – president of Remlu Inc. – Emergency Preparedness Planning
800 3rd ave 11th ave.; 212-748-3500
Lastly, I think it is important to note the progress fire safety has made over the past century and to investigate whether or not that progress seems sufficient enough considering the technology now available to us and the tragedies that have occurred due to unsafe conditions, or inadequate responses to danger and fire.
I am looking into outdated, un-enforced safety procedures and codes in high-rise buildings. Many buildings need to update their fire alarms and procedures. How effective are radios in the case of a fire? The FDNY has begun using a new radio called UHF portable radios. How are they working out? What is the procedure when a fire alarm fails to sound, how do people know to evacuate the building? How effective is knocking on residents doors in the middle of the night at saving people from smoke and fire?
Talk to NY Fire Department to learn about UHF, standard procedure, problems they face and prospective solutions.
-How quick is arrival of fire trucks? Is it quick enough?
NYFD – Nicholas Scoppetta – Commissioner of Fire Department or
Department of City Planning- Amanda M. Burden – Chair of City Planning Commission
What is a typical cause of fire and what is done to help prevent them from starting? To educate people on the problem?
Tips from FDNY website:
http://www.nyc.gov/html/fdny/html/units/fire_prevention/fire_prev_forms.shtml
Bureau of Fire Prevention:
http://www.nyc.gov/html/fdny/html/units/fire_prevention/fire_prev_index.shtml
National Fire Protection Association: 617-984-7275
NYC Dept. of Buildings Commissioner – Patricia Lancaster – 212-566-3473
What do “emergency preparedness experts” look at when evaluating a building’s situation? What factors vary from building to building that require different hi-rises to have different preparedness plans? How many buildings participate in such screenings and how effective are they?
Talk to Walter Ulmer – president of Remlu Inc. – Emergency Preparedness Planning
800 3rd ave 11th ave.; 212-748-3500
Lastly, I think it is important to note the progress fire safety has made over the past century and to investigate whether or not that progress seems sufficient enough considering the technology now available to us and the tragedies that have occurred due to unsafe conditions, or inadequate responses to danger and fire.
Saturday, February 16, 2008
FDNY Fire Safety
I'm sure you guys have found this, but here it is so that you can look at it.
http://www.nyc.gov/html/fdny/html/safety/firesafety_highrise.shtml
Ways to Keep your Apartment Safe
- Never keep rubbish in the hallway. Make sure it is stored properly and collected regularly.
- Don't put items in the trash chute that are too big and may get stuck. Things caught in the chute easily can turn a fire in the basement into a fire on your floor.
- Be careful not to overload electrical circuits. Short circuits are the cause of many fires.
- Cook with care. Keep a small portable dry chemical fire extinguisher readily available (Class B or K extinguisher). Baking soda is also a handy household item that can be used to smother stove fires.
- Never smoke in bed and make sure that there are no smoldering butts when you empty ashtrays.
- Test smoke detectors weekly and replace batteries twice a year (the beginning & end of Daylight Savings time).
- Make sure that your apartment door is a tight-fitting self-closing type of door in compliance with the fire code. Should your door not self-close, request this repair from your building manager.
- Inspect your exit stair doors. They must be self-closing, snap shut and unlock from both sides. If they don't meet this standard, report it to the superintendent or the Fire Department.
If The Fire is in Your Apartment
- Get everyone out. Stay low as you go out. Close but don't lock all doors in the apartment as you leave.
- Alert others on the floor by knocking on doors. Activate the fire alarm if there is one.
- Go down the nearest STAIRWAY, holding the railing.
- Call the Fire Department from a floor BELOW THE FIRE or from a street fire alarm box outside.
If the Fire is NOT in Your Apartment
- Stay inside rather than entering smoke-filled hallways, especially if the fire is on a floor below your apartment.
- Keep your door closed.
- Seal the door with duct tape or wet sheets and towels. Seal ventilators and any other openings where smoke may enter.
- Turn off air conditioners.
- Fill your bathtub with water. If the front door gets hot, wet it down.
- Unless flames or smoke are coming from below, open your windows a few inches at the top or bottom. Don't break the windows; they may need to be closed later.
- Call the Fire Department with your apartment number and a description of the conditions in your apartment. Firefighters will be directed to your location.
- If you feel you are in grave danger, open a window and wave a bed sheet for firefighters to spot you.
Planning Ahead Can Save Your Life
Things to know:
- The layout of your floor.
- The location of all stair exits from your floor.
- The number of doors between your apartment and the exit stairs. This is essential knowledge to find the exit in the dark.
- Where your apartment key is located. Take the key with you if you are forced to evacuate.
- The location of fire alarm boxes (if your building has them.)
Things to Do
- Keep flashlights ready and in a handy place.
- Install and maintain smoke detectors. Owners of high-rise buildings are required by law to install one detector in each apartment, but its maintenance is up to you.
- Report fire hazards to your superintendent. Blocked exits, piled-up trash, missing exit lights and open fire doors are violations of law. If your superintendent doesn't correct them call the Fire Department (718) 999-2541, and report the condition. Your life may depend on getting the violations corrected.
http://www.nyc.gov/html/fdny/html/safety/firesafety_highrise.shtml
Friday, February 15, 2008
21 Recommendations of Task Force
As recommended in class, we should all be familiar with these
21 Recommendations from the Department of Buildings Task Force
13 Recommendations Adopted. Proposed in Legislation September 23, 2003 and Passed June 24, 2004
21 Recommendations from the Department of Buildings Task Force
- Publish structural design guidelines for optional application to enhance robustness and resistance to progressive collapse.
- Prohibit the use of open web bar trusses in new commercial high-rise construction over 75 feet in height, pending the development of an appropriate standard recommended by NIST.
- Encourage use of available impact resistant materials in the construction of stair and elevator shaft enclosures until appropriate standards can be developed.
- Work with the Department of City Planning to exempt floor area of stairwells above minimum requirements from zoning Floor Area Ratio (FAR) calculations to encourage the inclusion of more stairwells or wider stairwells in buildings.
- Prohibit the use of scissors stairs in high-rise commercial buildings with a floor plate of over 10,000 square feet.
- Improve marking of the egress path, doors and stairs with photo-luminescent materials and retrofit existing exit signs with either battery or generator backup power.
- Mandate a full building evacuation plan for non-fire related events.
- Work with the Department of City Planning to exclude floor area of "fire towers" from Floor Area Ratio (FAR) calculations to encourage their use.
- Mandate protected vestibules at elevator lobbies in newly constructed occupancy group E buildings greater than 75 feet.
- Require controlled inspections to ensure that fireproofing is fully intact on all structural building members exposed by subsequent renovations to ensure continued compliance with applicable code requirements.
- Require all high-rise commercial buildings over 100 feet without automatic sprinkler protection to install a sprinkler system throughout the building within 15 years.
- Require all occupancy group E buildings to maintain a Building Information Card (BIC) listing a building's vital features.
- Enhance Fire Department emergency response communications in high rise commercial buildings.
- Provide additional training for Fire Safety Directors.
- Limit diameter of fuel oil transfer piping in systems using day tanks.
- Implement standards for piping that is utilized to distribute fuel oil to equipment without the use of a day tank.
- Exclude floor drains for elevator vestibule and shafts from being counted as fixtures in calculating normal waste water pipe capacity.
- Require air intakes in all new construction to be located at least 20' above grade and away from exhaust discharges or off street loading bays.
- Require controlled inspections of HVAC fire dampers in newly constructed occupancy group E buildings.
- Wait for the recommendation of Mayoral Commission on adoption of national model code and incorporate Task Force recommendations into any locally specific modifications.
- Encourage buildings within NYC geographic boundaries and subject to other jurisdictional authority comply with NYC Building Code through collaborative agreements.
13 Recommendations Adopted. Proposed in Legislation September 23, 2003 and Passed June 24, 2004
- Full Sprinkler Protection for Office Buildings. Owners of all existing office buildings 100 feet or greater in height which are not already fully sprinklered will be required to fully sprinkler their buildings on or before January 1, 2019. Owners may apply for an extension of the sprinkler installation deadline in cases of hardship and partial waivers where installation would be impracticable due to structural conditions or interior Landmark designations.
- Improved Markings, Exit Signage, and Back-up Power to Exit Signs. Exit stairs and doors in new or existing high-rise office buildings will be required to have glow-in-the-dark markings. New and existing high-rise (75 feet or greater) office buildings will be required to install additional signs where exit stairs have horizontal extensions, where stairwell re-entry doors are recessed to assist egress. Existing high-rise office buildings with grandfathered exit signs will be required to provide back-up power to those signs.
- Restrict the Use of Open Web Steel Joists. The failure of open web steel joists under extreme heat and fire are prime suspects in the WTC collapse. (A possible related cause for the collapses was the failure of spray-on fireproofing to remain adhered to these joists.) This recommendation will prohibit the use of open web steel joists in all new, non-residential high-rise buildings until appropriate fireproofing standards are developed and promulgated by the Commissioner of the Department of Buildings.
- Inspection of Sprayed-on Fireproofing. Spray-on fireproofing is only effective when it remains on the steel structure to which it was applied. This recommendation mandates that controlled inspections be performed to assess the integrity of spray-on fireproofing during building alterations where such fireproofing is exposed.
- Impact-Resistant Stair and Elevator Enclosures. In many accounts of the WTC tragedy, the drywall encasing the stairwells in the impact area disintegrated, blocking egress for some. This recommendation would require the use of more impact-resistant stair and elevator enclosures in high-rise office buildings constructed or altered after January 1, 2006. The Commissioner of the Department of Buildings will promulgate appropriate standards by July 1, 2005.
- Restricted Use of Scissor Stairs. “Scissor” stairs are two intertwining sets of staircases separated by a common wall and floors. While this allows for more square footage in a building, it concentrates the number of exit stairs in one area of the building – which may prevent occupants from escaping during an emergency (for instance, if a fire is blocking the only stairway entrance on a floor.) Under this recommendation, scissor stair assemblies will be prohibited in new high-rise office buildings with relatively large floor plates (over 10,000 square feet).
Other Task Force’s recommendations include:
- Full Building Evacuation Planning. High-rise office buildings will be required to have plans for full building evacuation for events other than fires.
- Smoke Stop Elevator Vestibules. In new high-rise office buildings, elevators serving four or more stories will be required to have smoke stop elevator vestibules, which will help to prevent smoke from spreading throughout a building during a fire.
- Controlled Inspections of Fire Dampers. Currently, mechanical ductwork is required under the Building Code to have “dampers,” which close shut to prevent fires from spreading. A specific controlled inspection of these dampers will be required when new ventilation systems are installed.
- Raising Air Intake Locations. Current code calls for air intakes for mechanical ventilation systems to be a minimum of six feet above ground level. That minimum would be increased to 20 feet above ground, and existing requirements that such air intakes be located away from exhaust discharges and off-street loading bays will be clarified.
- Prohibition of Oversized Fuel Oil Transfer Piping. To help prevent unauthorized storage of fuel oil, oversized fuel oil transfer piping will be prohibited for all new installations and alterations.
- Excluding Certain Floor Drains from Normal Fixture Counts. Water that is used to fight fires in high-rises may end up draining into elevator shafts, causing elevator equipment to malfunction. To allow that problem to be avoided, this recommendation will exclude floor drains in elevator shafts and vestibules from wastewater capacity calculations.
- Setting Standards for Fuel Oil Transfer Piping. New minimum technical standards will be required for fuel oil transfer piping to generators where there is no storage tank above the lowest floor for all new installations and alterations.
Corruption and Construction
The Sunday Times had a great article that says almost exactly what I was thinking-
Highlights-
'The fact is the dollars involved in the construction industry are so great and the opportunities at so many levels for corruption are so broad that this is a problem that will never, ever go away,'' he said.[Robert D. Luskin, a former federal organized crime prosecutor who is special counsel to the Laborers' International Union of North America].
Gordon S. Heddell, the inspector general for the United States Labor Department, said-"Organized crime is like a cancer. Sometimes we treat it and beat it, but sometimes new forms emerge.''
There is a Daily News article that is also great, but totally packed, called "Extreme Makeover, Now," (couldn't link to it, sorry). It takes a less dire view of the unions' role in construction corruption. It also mentions the Brian Kates series in the Daily News which is useful but also very dense. More importantly it makes some of the key points I had hoped to verify, such as the fact that the code was known to not be up to speed nor enforceable by the department of buildings due to the building boom, and the importance of the role of unions (whatever it may be) in this debacle.
I now need to:
Highlights-
'The fact is the dollars involved in the construction industry are so great and the opportunities at so many levels for corruption are so broad that this is a problem that will never, ever go away,'' he said.[Robert D. Luskin, a former federal organized crime prosecutor who is special counsel to the Laborers' International Union of North America].
Gordon S. Heddell, the inspector general for the United States Labor Department, said-"Organized crime is like a cancer. Sometimes we treat it and beat it, but sometimes new forms emerge.''
There is a Daily News article that is also great, but totally packed, called "Extreme Makeover, Now," (couldn't link to it, sorry). It takes a less dire view of the unions' role in construction corruption. It also mentions the Brian Kates series in the Daily News which is useful but also very dense. More importantly it makes some of the key points I had hoped to verify, such as the fact that the code was known to not be up to speed nor enforceable by the department of buildings due to the building boom, and the importance of the role of unions (whatever it may be) in this debacle.
I now need to:
- Follow up on the changes in enforcement not just the code in the wake of [Dept of Building's head] Lancaster's getting lambasted by the Daily News
- Talk to unions
Thursday, February 14, 2008
Andrea's update - Fire and stairs
I'm looking at Fire in Tall Buildings, but I've found some handy contact information as well.
Research:
Review of archived press materials (New York Times, Newsday, Village Voice)
Review of NIST reports related to fire codes (WTC compliance and recommendations)
Collected FDNY documents related to past, current and proposed Fire Safety codes
Identifying possible primary sources from archived materials and reports and locating contact information
Possible contacts identified:
NIST lead investigator on WTC report– Sivaraj Shyam-Sunder, 301-975-6713, sivaraj.shyam-sunder@nist.gov
NIST senior engineer - Richard W. Bukowski, 301-975-6853, richard.bukowski@nist.gov - investigated Port Authority compliance with building codes
NYC Dept. of Buildings PIO - Jennifer Givner, 212-566-3473 – endorsed NIST findings against Port Authority
NYC Dept. of Buildings Commissioner – Patricia Lancaster – 212-566-3473
John Jay College of Criminal Justice, CUNY, Department of Public Management Professor and advisor to NIST on Fire Management –
Glenn Corbett (212.237.8092, gcorbett@jjay.cuny.edu)
Port Authority Public Information Officer – Steve Coleman – 212-435-7777
Port Authority Public Affairs Director – John McCarthy – 212-435-7777
National Fire Protection Association: 617-984-7275
President - James Shannon –
NFPA Building Fire Protection and Life Safety -
Robert E. Solomon, Assistant Vice President and Jill T. McGovern, Secretary
NFPA Fire Protection Applications and Chemical Engineering - Guy R. Colonna, Assistant Vice President and Patti Mucci, Senior Technical Secretary
NFPA Public Fire Protection - Carl Peterson, Director and Stacey Van Zandt, Project Administrative Supervisor
NFPA Fire Analysis and Research - John R. Hall, Jr., Assistant Vice President and Helen J. Columbo, Secretary
Skyscraper Safety Campaign: http://www.skyscrapersafety.org/
Sally Regenhard, Chairperson; P. O. Box 70, Woodlawn Station, Bronx, NY 10470 - SallyR@SkyscraperSafety.org
AND
Monica Gabrielle, Co-Chairperson; P. O. Box 70, Woodlawn Station
Bronx, NY 10470 - monicagabrielle@earthlink.net
Notable information culled from materials:
Per NYT article: very few of recommendations from report after 1993 WTC bombing were effected by 9/11/01 - "It just didn't happen," said Patricia Lancaster, now the city buildings commissioner. NICE.
Per NYT article:
NYC building codes called for 4 staircases in each tower, but there were only 3 in each – total 6. 5 were destroyed by planes – one in south tower was used by at least 18 survivors.
“In the north tower, however, no one above the 91st floor was able to get out, even though about 1,000 are likely to have survived the impact of the hijacked airplane.”
- 4th staircases were required because Windows on the World (north tower) and observatory (south tower) had occupancy ratings over 1,000
- The Port Authority maintains that the stairway was not required.
The Port Authority is not bound by NYC codes, but claims to "meet or exceed"standards.
"On the issue of the fourth staircase, we will respectfully disagree with the N.I.S.T. findings and maintain that we met the city building codes in this area," said Steve Coleman, an agency spokesman.
Per NYT article: “Nationally, between 1989 and 1999, no more than five civilians were killed in 6,900 reported high-rise office building fires, according to statistics complied by the National Fire Protection Association.”
Per NYT article: “Dr. Sunder said that fully equipped firefighters - carrying nearly 100 pounds of gear up stairs - begin to reach their physiological limits about the 15th or 20th floor, and that it takes about two minutes to climb per floor. For people on the 60th floor of a building that has lost power, Dr. Sunder said, "help is actually a few hours away. We did not look at other buildings, but we are very confident in our recommendations."
And, a good summary of NIST findings by the NYT re: building design flaws and the staircase issue (I've edited below) - full story here:
“In a sobering lesson drawn from one of the day's great successes -- the escape of nearly everyone below the points of impact, about 14,000 people -- the report said that it had taken about twice as long to go down a single flight of stairs as had been projected by the current engineering standards for tall buildings. The buildings were only half full, investigators said, and if the attack had come at a time when they were filled to occupancy, the evacuation would not have been successful."
The impact changed tower structures in two critical ways... First, of the 47 columns in the core of each building, 9 were either severed or badly damaged in the north tower, and 11 in the south tower. Second, the impact dislodged the fireproofing that was sprayed on the floors and the columns. As the fires ignited by the jet fuel burned, the floors were weakened.
The floors played an important role in the structures, because they connected the exterior supports... to the columns hidden in the cores of the buildings. As the unprotected floors were weakened by fire, the exterior columns bowed inwards. In the north tower, they had moved 55 inches off center a few minutes before the collapse; in the south tower, they were 20 inches off center. As those columns became unstable, the building load shifted, but the instability was too great and the cascade of collapse began.
Much of the jet fuel burned outside the buildings in a fireball, but enough remained inside to ignite the office furnishings and building contents.
...the investigation ... raised serious questions about the adequacy of the original fireproofing applied to the steel in the towers. But in the areas where the fires were most severe, the amount of fireproofing that originally had been applied was ''moot'' because whatever had been there was knocked off by the planes.
During the design of the trade center, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey had decided to use a new version of the city building code that did not require as many staircases as the earlier edition. Instead of six staircases, including a specially reinforced fire escape, the trade center had three stairs in each tower. The investigators determined, though, that even the liberalized code required a fourth staircase, to accommodate the more than 1,000 people expected in the restaurant at the top of the north tower and at the observation deck atop the south tower.
As an interstate agency, the Port Authority is not bound by local building codes, but it had publicly pledged to ''meet or exceed'' the city code in building the trade center. However, the institute investigators determined that the Port Authority had not supplied enough staircases.
One of the documents included in yesterday's report showed that the Port Authority was eager to cut down on the amount of space devoted to stairs.
''The tower core should be redesigned to eliminate the fire towers and to take advantage of the more lenient provisions regarding exit stairs,'' wrote Malcolm P. Levy, the Port Authority's chief planning engineer, who is now deceased.
In the impact area of the north tower, the three staircases were about 70 feet apart and were destroyed immediately.
In the south tower, the plane hit on floors where the three staircases were about 200 feet apart, and one of them survived at least partially intact.
Next questions:
What are current/proposed requirements regarding staircases, number and dimensions?
What are ideal (according to NIST and NFPA) standards?
Research:
Review of archived press materials (New York Times, Newsday, Village Voice)
Review of NIST reports related to fire codes (WTC compliance and recommendations)
Collected FDNY documents related to past, current and proposed Fire Safety codes
Identifying possible primary sources from archived materials and reports and locating contact information
Possible contacts identified:
NIST lead investigator on WTC report– Sivaraj Shyam-Sunder, 301-975-6713, sivaraj.shyam-sunder@nist.gov
NIST senior engineer - Richard W. Bukowski, 301-975-6853, richard.bukowski@nist.gov - investigated Port Authority compliance with building codes
NYC Dept. of Buildings PIO - Jennifer Givner, 212-566-3473 – endorsed NIST findings against Port Authority
NYC Dept. of Buildings Commissioner – Patricia Lancaster – 212-566-3473
John Jay College of Criminal Justice, CUNY, Department of Public Management Professor and advisor to NIST on Fire Management –
Glenn Corbett (212.237.8092, gcorbett@jjay.cuny.edu)
Port Authority Public Information Officer – Steve Coleman – 212-435-7777
Port Authority Public Affairs Director – John McCarthy – 212-435-7777
National Fire Protection Association: 617-984-7275
President - James Shannon –
NFPA Building Fire Protection and Life Safety -
Robert E. Solomon, Assistant Vice President and Jill T. McGovern, Secretary
NFPA Fire Protection Applications and Chemical Engineering - Guy R. Colonna, Assistant Vice President and Patti Mucci, Senior Technical Secretary
NFPA Public Fire Protection - Carl Peterson, Director and Stacey Van Zandt, Project Administrative Supervisor
NFPA Fire Analysis and Research - John R. Hall, Jr., Assistant Vice President and Helen J. Columbo, Secretary
Skyscraper Safety Campaign: http://www.skyscrapersafety.org/
Sally Regenhard, Chairperson; P. O. Box 70, Woodlawn Station, Bronx, NY 10470 - SallyR@SkyscraperSafety.org
AND
Monica Gabrielle, Co-Chairperson; P. O. Box 70, Woodlawn Station
Bronx, NY 10470 - monicagabrielle@earthlink.net
Notable information culled from materials:
Per NYT article: very few of recommendations from report after 1993 WTC bombing were effected by 9/11/01 - "It just didn't happen," said Patricia Lancaster, now the city buildings commissioner. NICE.
Per NYT article:
NYC building codes called for 4 staircases in each tower, but there were only 3 in each – total 6. 5 were destroyed by planes – one in south tower was used by at least 18 survivors.
“In the north tower, however, no one above the 91st floor was able to get out, even though about 1,000 are likely to have survived the impact of the hijacked airplane.”
- 4th staircases were required because Windows on the World (north tower) and observatory (south tower) had occupancy ratings over 1,000
- The Port Authority maintains that the stairway was not required.
The Port Authority is not bound by NYC codes, but claims to "meet or exceed"standards.
"On the issue of the fourth staircase, we will respectfully disagree with the N.I.S.T. findings and maintain that we met the city building codes in this area," said Steve Coleman, an agency spokesman.
Per NYT article: “Nationally, between 1989 and 1999, no more than five civilians were killed in 6,900 reported high-rise office building fires, according to statistics complied by the National Fire Protection Association.”
Per NYT article: “Dr. Sunder said that fully equipped firefighters - carrying nearly 100 pounds of gear up stairs - begin to reach their physiological limits about the 15th or 20th floor, and that it takes about two minutes to climb per floor. For people on the 60th floor of a building that has lost power, Dr. Sunder said, "help is actually a few hours away. We did not look at other buildings, but we are very confident in our recommendations."
And, a good summary of NIST findings by the NYT re: building design flaws and the staircase issue (I've edited below) - full story here:
“In a sobering lesson drawn from one of the day's great successes -- the escape of nearly everyone below the points of impact, about 14,000 people -- the report said that it had taken about twice as long to go down a single flight of stairs as had been projected by the current engineering standards for tall buildings. The buildings were only half full, investigators said, and if the attack had come at a time when they were filled to occupancy, the evacuation would not have been successful."
The impact changed tower structures in two critical ways... First, of the 47 columns in the core of each building, 9 were either severed or badly damaged in the north tower, and 11 in the south tower. Second, the impact dislodged the fireproofing that was sprayed on the floors and the columns. As the fires ignited by the jet fuel burned, the floors were weakened.
The floors played an important role in the structures, because they connected the exterior supports... to the columns hidden in the cores of the buildings. As the unprotected floors were weakened by fire, the exterior columns bowed inwards. In the north tower, they had moved 55 inches off center a few minutes before the collapse; in the south tower, they were 20 inches off center. As those columns became unstable, the building load shifted, but the instability was too great and the cascade of collapse began.
Much of the jet fuel burned outside the buildings in a fireball, but enough remained inside to ignite the office furnishings and building contents.
...the investigation ... raised serious questions about the adequacy of the original fireproofing applied to the steel in the towers. But in the areas where the fires were most severe, the amount of fireproofing that originally had been applied was ''moot'' because whatever had been there was knocked off by the planes.
During the design of the trade center, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey had decided to use a new version of the city building code that did not require as many staircases as the earlier edition. Instead of six staircases, including a specially reinforced fire escape, the trade center had three stairs in each tower. The investigators determined, though, that even the liberalized code required a fourth staircase, to accommodate the more than 1,000 people expected in the restaurant at the top of the north tower and at the observation deck atop the south tower.
As an interstate agency, the Port Authority is not bound by local building codes, but it had publicly pledged to ''meet or exceed'' the city code in building the trade center. However, the institute investigators determined that the Port Authority had not supplied enough staircases.
One of the documents included in yesterday's report showed that the Port Authority was eager to cut down on the amount of space devoted to stairs.
''The tower core should be redesigned to eliminate the fire towers and to take advantage of the more lenient provisions regarding exit stairs,'' wrote Malcolm P. Levy, the Port Authority's chief planning engineer, who is now deceased.
In the impact area of the north tower, the three staircases were about 70 feet apart and were destroyed immediately.
In the south tower, the plane hit on floors where the three staircases were about 200 feet apart, and one of them survived at least partially intact.
Next questions:
What are current/proposed requirements regarding staircases, number and dimensions?
What are ideal (according to NIST and NFPA) standards?
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