Something is Rotten in City’s Building Inspections Plan.

By Joy Wiltermuth

The Deutsche Bank building stands as an abandoned, gloomy hulk that was badly damaged and filled with toxic debris during the collapse of 2 World Trade Center. After a 22-foot length of steel pipe fell from the building while it was being torn down last year, and landed onto the adjacent roof of the local firehouse, it sparked fire department protests and calls for additional safety measures.

Three months later, a fire broke out in the partly demolished building that led to the deaths of two firefighters. An investigation following the blaze concluded that firefighters Robert Beddia and Joseph Graffagnino were left in the burning building for more than an hour without water, due to a dismantled fire connection and broken standpipe. Several fire exits were barricaded, when the subcontractor attempted to limit asbestos exposure in the floor-by-floor deconstruction.

The tragedy set off a bitter fight between the firefighter’s union and the Fire Commissioner over accountability in the lapsed fire inspections and the hazardous conditions at the site. “Smoke and mirrors seems to be the Department’s response to this department-created situation that has eroded over the years,” said William Romaka, the Uniformed Firefighters Association Health and Safety Officer.

Stephen J. Cassidy, President of the UFA, called for Fire Commissioner Nicholas Scoppetta to accept responsibility for department failures following the blaze and requested an independent investigation. Cassidy said the higher echelons knew of the dangers, which plagued the Deutsche Bank, when Chief William Siegel recommended a targeted fire inspection plan for the toxic site three years earlier.

Siegel’s plan addressed hazards posed to firefighters that included exposure to asbestos, dioxins and heavy metals released during abatement. Aware of such conditions at the former bank building, the union disclosed the lack of proper fire inspections that had ceased a year prior to the fatal fire.

Glen Corbett, a professor of fire science at John Jay College of Criminal Justice, said the New York City fire inspections program became a hot-button issue. In the days following the fire, he told the New York Post, “due to the scrutiny of this building, the lack of a pre-fire plan is unbelievable.”

Scoppetta and Mayor Bloomberg weighed in on the tragedy and three high-ranking firefighters were taken out of the field and reassigned. Bloomberg called for strict enforcement of the fire department’s building inspections schedule, which required bi-monthly, spontaneous visits by local fire companies to all buildings undergoing construction or demolition in their area.

Scoppetta announced a new Building Inspection Safety Program (BISP) in November and added a third day to the current 15-day building inspection cycle. Inspections are completed during the firefighter’s regular workday and, under the BISP, the hours each week reserved for completion of inspection duties were increased, from six to nine. Visits to local buildings begin in the morning and continue throughout the day until, or unless, the unit is called to respond to a fire emergency.

Cassidy called the BISP was “an obvious attempt to gloss over the failures of Department leadership, who knew the Deutsche Bank was a toxic mess.” He said the new inspection program would not resolve the problems of an unfeasible inspection cycle, which added to an already overburdened firefighter's workload.

Battalion Chief John J. McDonnell said, “The additional inspection period is a ‘band-aid’ approach to an ever-growing problem. McDonnell, President of the Uniformed Fire Officers Association and one of the reassigned officers, said it would be impossible to check every construction or demolition project under the current schedule and told the New York Times that city regulations did not take into account New York’s recent construction boom.

The department later agreed to cut back on fire inspections to buildings less than 75 feet high, to every 30 days. An attempt to modernize the city’s firefighting capabilities was put forth in March, the first comprehensive revision of the city's fire code proposed in nearly a century. It is slated to go into effect in July and will bring the Code in line with international standards.

While part of the proposed Fire Code Law focuses on fire safety technology, some have called it “a sprinkler system law.” Deputy Assistant Chief Ronald R. Spadafora worked on the Fire Code and said it addressed some of the major issues that faced the Fire Department following the World Trade Center collapse.

Spadafora called it particularly strong in areas of interdepartmental information sharing and said it improved and integrated computer systems. But, he said the offset to technological improvements was a compromise of practical aspects of fire prevention. “Some would say there are areas of the code that have not gone far enough,” he said.

The proposed Fire Code Law does not directly address the disputed fire inspections building program. Romaka said, “While the new Fire Code might, and could be beneficial, the real problem deals with an untrained inspection protocol that does little to correctly respond to the challenges we find ourselves in.” He said the lack of proper training for the vast majority of firefighters in the field has not been addressed.

The UFA called for a separately trained and staffed task force to remedy the growing need for professional fire inspectors, who can identify and report back to local units about dangerous or hazardous conditions. While new probationary firefighters are given increased building construction and inspection training, Romaka said, “In the past we had dedicated task forces that were allowed to be cut from the budget under the guise of doing more with less.” Spadafora said, “In a perfect world, there would be a separate task force, but that involves a budget and we have to work with the workforce we already have.”

Weighing in on the added third day of inspections, Romaka said, “Being judged on hours does not improve the quality of the inspection.” He said it detracted from the bonding between companies “that generally occurs at lunch time, at a time when we have so many new members that we strive to pass on traditions to.”

On December 12, the City Council’s Fire and Criminal Justice Services Committee requested an oversight hearing with respect to the Fire Department’s building inspections program. The Committee wanted to determine the staffing levels, training, equipment and qualifications of the inspectors. They also looked at the increase in levels of inspections and the impact that had on response times and safety. Scoppetta testified that fire response times had actually decreased since the new inspection plan was instituted, but Cassidy said the Commissioner provided no supporting data or statistics for his conclusion.

Cassidy said the number of fire engines on building inspections increased by 50 percent since December. While acknowledging the Fire Department’s responsibility to manage the city’s building inspection program, he said, “Every firefighter knows that his response times are negatively impacted.” A fire company out conducting routine building inspections is required to regroup and deploy when a fire emergency calls, sometimes to distant locations.

In a recent ratcheting up of the tensions, Romaka was excluded from certain departmental meetings, which related to technology oversight, and the UFA said he was targeted due to union activity. Cassidy said, “Rest assured, the Department’s actions will not stop the UFA from shining the light of truth on the Department when their policies endanger our members.”



Sources:
Scopetta Nov. 7, 2007, BISP Announcement
http://www.nyc.gov/html/fdny/html/pr/2007/110707_8507.shtml
UFA Nov. 20, 2007 Ltr to Members and Public
http://ufalocal94.org/pdf/db11_20.pdf
UFA Oct. 12, 2007 Charge of Cover-Up
http://ufalocal94.org/press/100907.php
Dec. 5, 2007 FDNY Proposed Fire Code
http://www.nyc.gov/html/fdny/html/pr/2007/120507_9107.shtml

Glen Corbett: 212-237-8092
William Romaka: 212-683-4832
Ronald R. Spadafora: 917-418-8653

Regenhardt, Collett, and Schwartz (audio)

Hi All,

Here's the link to the Regenhardt, Collett and Schwartz talk from last Friday. I'm sorry it took so long to get on-line.

I think this is decent quality - just bad enough resolution to lose my obnoxious, snarky comments, but just good enough to catch Chad's. :D Frederic Schwartz has a voice (and a beard) for radio, and he and all the other speakers came through better than Pat Alex did.

Also, by some miracle, the batteries of my recorder cut off at just 3 minutes after 1 p.m., so we got basically the whole talk.

David, you missed it. Come see me in my office after class.

Andrew

Link: http://saveandrewgarib.com/audio/08.04.04-13h03m50s_INV_Schwartz_Regenhardt_Collett.wma

Deutsche Bank and 15-Day Fire Inspection Cycle (Wiltermuth) Pitch

The towers came down on September 11, 2001, and promises were made. The nearby Deutsche Bank building stands as a marker from that day. Six and a half years later, in the midst of a massive construction boom, has high-rise safety been improved? What has stayed the same? A fire at the building in August killed two firefighters, exposing unsafe work conditions and a failed 15-day fire inspection cycle. The District Attorney launched an ongoing criminal investigation against the city, as well as against the subcontractor in charge of deconstruction. This story will focus on the 15-day fire inspection cycle. When was it first implemented? Did they know at the time that it was unfeasible?

Memo re Deutsche Bank Deconstruction/Investigation

Memo

To: Scaffolding
From: Joy Wiltermuth
Date: February 21, 2001
Re: Deutsche Bank Deconstruction/Investigation
____________________________________

Timeline of major events:

September 11, 2001:

130 Liberty Street building (the former Deutsche Bank Building) badly damaged in terrorist attacks in lower Manhattan

August 18, 2007:

Fire breaks out at 130 Liberty Street and firefighters Robert Beddia and Joseph Graffagnino are killed fighting the blaze.

September 8, 2007:

Fire Chiefs say 15-day inspection schedule is not realistic. Bloomberg said it is checking into whether or not other large buildings (in construction or deconstruction) are meeting the 15-day inspection schedule. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/14/nyregion/14deutsche.html?_r=1&scp=9&sq=deutsche+bank+fire&st=nyt&oref=slogin

September 2008:

The statement said Mr. Naftalis and his firm had been retained to help city lawyers respond to the storm of subpoenas issued by the office of Robert M. Morgenthau, the Manhattan district attorney, to advise the city and “to appropriately and fully cooperate” with the inquiry.
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/19/nyregion/19bank.html?scp=6&sq=deutsche+bank+fire&st=nyt


October 9, 2007:

Uniformed Firefighters Association, the union representing city firefighters and officers, are alleging a cover-up. The union presidents cited two high-level meetings in mid-September at which, they said, two senior chiefs called for a cessation of e-mail messages about the [Deutsche Bank] building.
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/10/nyregion/10fire.html?scp=4&sq=deutsche+bank+fire&st=nyt

January 14, 2008:

Fire Department alters its inspection schedule. In an effort to focus on larger and more complex construction and demolition projects, the Fire Department has decreased the frequency of inspections for some smaller projects. The move is part of a series of changes made in response to lapses exposed by the death of two firefighters at the former Deutsche Bank building. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/14/nyregion/14inspect.html?scp=8&sq=deutsche+bank+fire&st=nyt

February 14, 2008:

Sister of firefighter killed at Deutsche Bank sues LMDC and contractor at the site who “knowingly created those conditions.” “They had a responsibility to let the firefighters know, and they failed to do that.”
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/14/nyregion/14deutsche.html?_r=1&scp=9&sq=deutsche+bank+fire&st=nyt&oref=slogin



February 20, 2008:

Federal safety regulators have accused the contractors who were taking down the former Deutsche Bank tower in the summer of indifference or intentional disregard for dangerous conditions that led to a fatal fire there, and of a host of other serious safety violations, officials said on Tuesday.
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/20/nyregion/20deutsche.html?scp=7&sq=deutsche+bank+fire&st=nyt


February 21, 2008:

The Bloomberg administration and the state-run Lower Manhattan Development Corporation, both under scrutiny in the criminal investigation into the fatal Deutsche Bank fire, have incurred more than $2.2 million in fees for outside lawyers to defend their roles in the events that led up to the blaze, officials said this week.

The Bloomberg administration and the state-run Lower Manhattan Development Corporation, both under scrutiny in the criminal investigation into the fatal Deutsche Bank fire, have incurred more than $2.2 million in fees for outside lawyers to defend their roles in the events that led up to the blaze, officials said this week.

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/21/nyregion/21deutsche.html?scp=2&sq=deutsche+bank+fire&st=nyt


Major players:

1. The Lower Manhattan Development Corporation, which owns the building
2. Bovis Lend Lease, construction manager
3. John Galt Corporation, the subcontractor
4. Robert M. Morgenthau, the Manhattan district attorney
5. Uniformed Firefighters Association
6. Dept of Buildings DOB

Construction and Corruption (VOIEN)

The "building boom" that has occurred in Manhattan since 2003 has strained an already corrupt system of construction regulation and enforcement. I will highlight the involvement of unions and the mob in construction. I will investigate the resultant illegal construction and how it effects building codes. I will address matters of jurisdiction, union politics, and bureaucratic mishandling on the part of the city, and what impact these factors have on how construction regulation is enforced.

Deutsche Bank, The Smoking Gun

DEUTSCHE BANK (Joy Wiltermuth) It was badly damaged on September 11, 2001 and acquired by the Lower Manhattan Development Corporation to undertake its deconstruction. In August of 2007, a fire broke out at the site killing two firefighters and Morgenthau’s office quickly opened an investigation. Deconstruction has been halted amidst allegations of building code violations, negligence and corruption. Meanwhile, the city and the LMDC have retained prestigious criminal defense firms to deal with Morgenthau’s broadening inquiry and it is still uncertain under what conditions, demolition of the former Deutsche Bank would recommence. Are current building inspection plan realistic, safe or viable in light of the city’s construction boom?

FIRE SAFETY: WORDS VS. ACTIONS - Galyean

Galyean BUDGET LINE
FIRE SAFETY: WORDS VS. ACTIONS: The 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center demonstrated several fatal flaws in fire safety and evacuation procedures in the buildings. Many of these had already been identified in a Congressional report issued in 1995 following the 1993 WTC bombing. Of the nineteen recommendations made in the 1995 report, only a handful were implemented by 2001. The local real estate lobby was largely opposed to most of the safety revisions due to both immediate costs and the potential of lost rental revenue (if floor space was dedicated to escape routes, additional stairwells, etc.).
Why were so few of the 1995 recommendations implemented in the WTC and in the subsequent NYC fire safety codes? Is there reasonable evidence to suggest that implementing some of the other recommendations would have saved lives in the 2001 attacks? Is the response to the 2005 report on the 2001 catastrophe following the same pattern?

Building Design and Safety

I will be looking at skyscraper construction and safety considerations in their engineering and design.

Here are some articles that discuss how the World Trade Center's design and engineering contributed to the collapse of the towers.

USA Today: High Rises Remain Vulnerable After 9-11
New York Times: A Nation Challenged - Building Design, Report Sees Lower Towers That Can Empty Faster


Three important issues stood out from the article research:

1. Until June 2007, no fire or safety tests were done for multiple floors in skyscrapers, to see how materials would stand up to heat. The primary reason these tests were not done was cost.
2. Cost, is a factor again when thinking of protecting existing skyscrapers from a similar fate. It is relatively inexpensive in new construction to use better flame retardant materials however it becomes prohibitively expensive to upgrade existing buildings. The policy so far has been to grandfather older buildings instead of bringing them up to code.
3. Since building code changes could takes years, engineering and design firms help draft model codes for use locally to help developers, cities, designers, etc. react quickly to current flaws in engineering and design.

Going forward, I want to find out:

1. What engineering and design methods are being considered in skyscraper construction in the United States and overseas to facilitate mass evacuations
2. Case studies in the United States, Middle East (Dubai in particular where skyscrapers are being built larger and faster with the newest engineering techniques) and Asia (Kuala Lumpur and China especially).
3. Which materials can withstand heat, wind and fire on multiple levels in skyscrapers (what is being used currently and what is being considered and why)
4. Alternatives to common engineering techniques
5. Landscape Architecture considerations for safety and evacuation from tall buildings
6. Expert opinions from architects and engineers

Some organizations and firms that are active in New York:

Building Owners and Managers Association
Council on Tall Buildings and Urban Habitat
Kohn Pederson Fox Architects
Worcester Polytechnic Institute

Other sources of information on skyscraper design and safety:
Fire/Safety Building and Design- The Safety Library (also a good site for disaster safety, emergency management, terrorism, etc.)

(good article!) Reconstructing New York’s Building Code Overhaul

This is the article about the building cord written in 2007.

Mayor Michael Bloomberg propsed a massive overhaul of the city's building code, the first in nearly 40 years in 2007.

Under the proposed regulations, for example, all new buildings over 55 feet tall, which would include the Bronx home, would be required to have a more fire-resistant stairway, automatic sprinkler systems, and hardwired smoke alarms that sound in every room.
Also still there are issue of cost of construction and in turn, increase the cost of housing.

link.
http://www.gothamgazette.com/article/issueoftheweek/20070514/200/2181

Giambusso Memo

Building Battles:

OVERVIEW:

I am attempting to examine the political battles that go into building and development. I hope to examine specific sites and demonstrate how the pressures of City Council, Congress, developers, community groups etc, shape building safety. I would like to look at a development that has been finished, one that is being constructed and ne that is in the planning stages.

I am looking specifically to examine how the race to develop may be having a deleterious effect on building safety. Politicians and developers are often involved in projects that garner government funds (affordable housing, brownfield development) making enterprises more lucrative for builders.

The question I hope to raise is how safe are these projects, what are the standards and what have been the real-life consequences of projects that perhaps moved too quickly for political economic expediency while ignoring safety standards.


FIRST SITE: Gowanus Canal, “Public Place”
Lede(?)

Along the trendy restaurants of Cobble Hill and the nouveau-chic bars of Park Slope, underneath the lacquered hardwood walkups, where hipsters, yuppies and trustafarians, meet, live, and raise their young, between two lands conquered by the inexorable armies of gentrification, there runs a river of poison--a mile and half of putrid waterway that once served the factories and chemical plants lining its banks.

For over a century the Gowanus Canal has acted as an industrial sewer, suffering the runoff of tanneries, machine shops, and factories churning soap, paint, ink, and sulfur. The waterway, which connects Upper New York Bay to the neighborhoods of Red Hook, South Brooklyn, and Park Slope, runs along a flood basin of toxicity.

In the eyes of politicians, the banks of the Gowanus are a fertile ground for green spaces and affordable housing. In the eyes of developers, the Gowanus valley is a gold prospect promising government funding and quick profits. For the starry-eyed denizens of the outlying neighborhoods, the land along the Gowanus is another chance to recreate the city’s landscape in their own image--complete with coffee shops, dog runs, and tree lined walkways through which to push the seemingly endless stream of baby carriages that follows the march of young urban affluence.

In the fever to develop this infamous stretch, though, some in the community have raised the unwelcome flag of caution and warned that we may not know exactly what has been created underneath these banks. There is skepticism that a layer of sod and some shrubberies may only mask the feet of sledge and chemical waste that have built up over the last one hundred years. Some warn that the consequences of living among these noxious deposits may be dire…

SECOND SITE: Atlantic Yards

THIRD SITE:


LINKS:

http://www.brooklyneagle.com/categories/category.php?category_id=5&id=18585

http://www.brooklyneagle.com/categories/category.php?category_id=27&id=18300

http://www.gowanus.org/gowanus.htm

http://www.waterfrontmuseum.org/dredgers/links/voice.html

http://www.gowanusartists.com/home.html

http://www.plannyc.org/project-75-Gowanus-Development

CONTACT:

Jessica Pozzuoli: Television Producer, Environmental Activist, Urban Planner
Sarah Ryley: Reporter, Brooklyn Daily Eagle
Bill deBlasio, NYCity Council
David Yassky, NYC Council
Jim Brennan, NYS Assembly
Nydia Velazquez, U.S. House of Reps, 11th District. (The fightin 11th!)
Toll Brothers Development Co.
A.J. Carter, press person at the Empire State Development Corporation
Bob Zuckerman, GCCDC
Patricia Culligan, Professor Engineering Mechanics at Columbia University
NYC D of Buildings
DEP
Seth Donlin, spokesman, Department of Housing Preservation and Development (NYC DHPD)
Bette Stoltz, executive director of the South Brooklyn Local Development Corporation (SBLDC)

TO DO:

GOWANUS
• Get a copy of Culligan’s report/conduct interviews to learn what clean up methods are used in brownfields.
• Also from Culligan, where else have cleanup methods been used and what have been the consequences.
• Contact policymakers, agencies, advocates to determine who is pro, who is against Public Place (GCCDC, SBLDC, EDC, NYS DEP, HPD, D of B, Yassky, Brennan, Velazquez)
• Determine how much Public Place will cost: cleanup, design, construction commercial rent, residential rent, government funding
• Visit other Toll Brothers sites. Do they usually flip brown fields? What do residents say of their developments what is their reputation, who are the architects?
• Visit sites listed in Culligan’s report

21 Recommendations of Task Force

As recommended in class, we should all be familiar with these

21 Recommendations from the Department of Buildings Task Force

1. Publish structural design guidelines for optional application to enhance robustness and resistance to progressive collapse.
2. Prohibit the use of open web bar trusses in new commercial high-rise construction over 75 feet in height, pending the development of an appropriate standard recommended by NIST.
3. Encourage use of available impact resistant materials in the construction of stair and elevator shaft enclosures until appropriate standards can be developed.
4. Work with the Department of City Planning to exempt floor area of stairwells above minimum requirements from zoning Floor Area Ratio (FAR) calculations to encourage the inclusion of more stairwells or wider stairwells in buildings.
5. Prohibit the use of scissors stairs in high-rise commercial buildings with a floor plate of over 10,000 square feet.
6. Improve marking of the egress path, doors and stairs with photo-luminescent materials and retrofit existing exit signs with either battery or generator backup power.
7. Mandate a full building evacuation plan for non-fire related events.
8. Work with the Department of City Planning to exclude floor area of "fire towers" from Floor Area Ratio (FAR) calculations to encourage their use.
9. Mandate protected vestibules at elevator lobbies in newly constructed occupancy group E buildings greater than 75 feet.
10. Require controlled inspections to ensure that fireproofing is fully intact on all structural building members exposed by subsequent renovations to ensure continued compliance with applicable code requirements.
11. Require all high-rise commercial buildings over 100 feet without automatic sprinkler protection to install a sprinkler system throughout the building within 15 years.
12. Require all occupancy group E buildings to maintain a Building Information Card (BIC) listing a building's vital features.
13. Enhance Fire Department emergency response communications in high rise commercial buildings.
14. Provide additional training for Fire Safety Directors.
15. Limit diameter of fuel oil transfer piping in systems using day tanks.
16. Implement standards for piping that is utilized to distribute fuel oil to equipment without the use of a day tank.
17. Exclude floor drains for elevator vestibule and shafts from being counted as fixtures in calculating normal waste water pipe capacity.
18. Require air intakes in all new construction to be located at least 20' above grade and away from exhaust discharges or off street loading bays.
19. Require controlled inspections of HVAC fire dampers in newly constructed occupancy group E buildings.
20. Wait for the recommendation of Mayoral Commission on adoption of national model code and incorporate Task Force recommendations into any locally specific modifications.
21. Encourage buildings within NYC geographic boundaries and subject to other jurisdictional authority comply with NYC Building Code through collaborative agreements.

13 Recommendations Adopted. Proposed in Legislation September 23, 2003 and Passed June 24, 2004

• Full Sprinkler Protection for Office Buildings. Owners of all existing office buildings 100 feet or greater in height which are not already fully sprinklered will be required to fully sprinkler their buildings on or before January 1, 2019. Owners may apply for an extension of the sprinkler installation deadline in cases of hardship and partial waivers where installation would be impracticable due to structural conditions or interior Landmark designations.
  
  
• Improved Markings, Exit Signage, and Back-up Power to Exit Signs. Exit stairs and doors in new or existing high-rise office buildings will be required to have glow-in-the-dark markings. New and existing high-rise (75 feet or greater) office buildings will be required to install additional signs where exit stairs have horizontal extensions, where stairwell re-entry doors are recessed to assist egress. Existing high-rise office buildings with grandfathered exit signs will be required to provide back-up power to those signs.
  
  
• Restrict the Use of Open Web Steel Joists. The failure of open web steel joists under extreme heat and fire are prime suspects in the WTC collapse. (A possible related cause for the collapses was the failure of spray-on fireproofing to remain adhered to these joists.) This recommendation will prohibit the use of open web steel joists in all new, non-residential high-rise buildings until appropriate fireproofing standards are developed and promulgated by the Commissioner of the Department of Buildings.
  
  
• Inspection of Sprayed-on Fireproofing. Spray-on fireproofing is only effective when it remains on the steel structure to which it was applied. This recommendation mandates that controlled inspections be performed to assess the integrity of spray-on fireproofing during building alterations where such fireproofing is exposed.
  
  
• Impact-Resistant Stair and Elevator Enclosures. In many accounts of the WTC tragedy, the drywall encasing the stairwells in the impact area disintegrated, blocking egress for some. This recommendation would require the use of more impact-resistant stair and elevator enclosures in high-rise office buildings constructed or altered after January 1, 2006. The Commissioner of the Department of Buildings will promulgate appropriate standards by July 1, 2005.
  
  
• Restricted Use of Scissor Stairs. “Scissor” stairs are two intertwining sets of staircases separated by a common wall and floors. While this allows for more square footage in a building, it concentrates the number of exit stairs in one area of the building – which may prevent occupants from escaping during an emergency (for instance, if a fire is blocking the only stairway entrance on a floor.) Under this recommendation, scissor stair assemblies will be prohibited in new high-rise office buildings with relatively large floor plates (over 10,000 square feet).

Other Task Force’s recommendations include:

• Full Building Evacuation Planning. High-rise office buildings will be required to have plans for full building evacuation for events other than fires.
  
  
• Smoke Stop Elevator Vestibules. In new high-rise office buildings, elevators serving four or more stories will be required to have smoke stop elevator vestibules, which will help to prevent smoke from spreading throughout a building during a fire.
  
  
• Controlled Inspections of Fire Dampers. Currently, mechanical ductwork is required under the Building Code to have “dampers,” which close shut to prevent fires from spreading. A specific controlled inspection of these dampers will be required when new ventilation systems are installed.
  
  
• Raising Air Intake Locations. Current code calls for air intakes for mechanical ventilation systems to be a minimum of six feet above ground level. That minimum would be increased to 20 feet above ground, and existing requirements that such air intakes be located away from exhaust discharges and off-street loading bays will be clarified.
  
  
• Prohibition of Oversized Fuel Oil Transfer Piping. To help prevent unauthorized storage of fuel oil, oversized fuel oil transfer piping will be prohibited for all new installations and alterations.
  
  
• Excluding Certain Floor Drains from Normal Fixture Counts. Water that is used to fight fires in high-rises may end up draining into elevator shafts, causing elevator equipment to malfunction. To allow that problem to be avoided, this recommendation will exclude floor drains in elevator shafts and vestibules from wastewater capacity calculations.
  
  
• Setting Standards for Fuel Oil Transfer Piping. New minimum technical standards will be required for fuel oil transfer piping to generators where there is no storage tank above the lowest floor for all new installations and alterations.

Andrea's update - Fire and stairs

I'm looking at Fire in Tall Buildings, but I've found some handy contact information as well.

Research:
Review of archived press materials (New York Times, Newsday, Village Voice)
Review of NIST reports related to fire codes (WTC compliance and recommendations)
Collected FDNY documents related to past, current and proposed Fire Safety codes
Identifying possible primary sources from archived materials and reports and locating contact information

Possible contacts identified:
NIST lead investigator on WTC report– Sivaraj Shyam-Sunder, 301-975-6713, sivaraj.shyam-sunder@nist.gov

NIST senior engineer - Richard W. Bukowski, 301-975-6853, richard.bukowski@nist.gov - investigated Port Authority compliance with building codes

NYC Dept. of Buildings PIO - Jennifer Givner, 212-566-3473 – endorsed NIST findings against Port Authority

NYC Dept. of Buildings Commissioner – Patricia Lancaster – 212-566-3473

John Jay College of Criminal Justice, CUNY, Department of Public Management Professor and advisor to NIST on Fire Management –
Glenn Corbett (212.237.8092, gcorbett@jjay.cuny.edu)

Port Authority Public Information Officer – Steve Coleman – 212-435-7777

Port Authority Public Affairs Director – John McCarthy – 212-435-7777

National Fire Protection Association: 617-984-7275
President - James Shannon –
NFPA Building Fire Protection and Life Safety -
Robert E. Solomon, Assistant Vice President and Jill T. McGovern, Secretary
NFPA Fire Protection Applications and Chemical Engineering - Guy R. Colonna, Assistant Vice President and Patti Mucci, Senior Technical Secretary

NFPA Public Fire Protection - Carl Peterson, Director and Stacey Van Zandt, Project Administrative Supervisor
NFPA Fire Analysis and Research - John R. Hall, Jr., Assistant Vice President and Helen J. Columbo, Secretary

Skyscraper Safety Campaign: http://www.skyscrapersafety.org/
Sally Regenhard, Chairperson; P. O. Box 70, Woodlawn Station, Bronx, NY 10470 - SallyR@SkyscraperSafety.org
AND
Monica Gabrielle, Co-Chairperson; P. O. Box 70, Woodlawn Station
Bronx, NY 10470 - monicagabrielle@earthlink.net

Notable information culled from materials:

Per NYT article: very few of recommendations from report after 1993 WTC bombing were effected by 9/11/01 - "It just didn't happen," said Patricia Lancaster, now the city buildings commissioner. NICE.

Per NYT article:
NYC building codes called for 4 staircases in each tower, but there were only 3 in each – total 6. 5 were destroyed by planes – one in south tower was used by at least 18 survivors.
“In the north tower, however, no one above the 91st floor was able to get out, even though about 1,000 are likely to have survived the impact of the hijacked airplane.”
- 4th staircases were required because Windows on the World (north tower) and observatory (south tower) had occupancy ratings over 1,000
- The Port Authority maintains that the stairway was not required.
The Port Authority is not bound by NYC codes, but claims to "meet or exceed"standards.
"On the issue of the fourth staircase, we will respectfully disagree with the N.I.S.T. findings and maintain that we met the city building codes in this area," said Steve Coleman, an agency spokesman.

Per NYT article: “Nationally, between 1989 and 1999, no more than five civilians were killed in 6,900 reported high-rise office building fires, according to statistics complied by the National Fire Protection Association.”

Per NYT article: “Dr. Sunder said that fully equipped firefighters - carrying nearly 100 pounds of gear up stairs - begin to reach their physiological limits about the 15th or 20th floor, and that it takes about two minutes to climb per floor. For people on the 60th floor of a building that has lost power, Dr. Sunder said, "help is actually a few hours away. We did not look at other buildings, but we are very confident in our recommendations."

And, a good summary of NIST findings by the NYT re: building design flaws and the staircase issue (I've edited below) - full story here:
“In a sobering lesson drawn from one of the day's great successes -- the escape of nearly everyone below the points of impact, about 14,000 people -- the report said that it had taken about twice as long to go down a single flight of stairs as had been projected by the current engineering standards for tall buildings. The buildings were only half full, investigators said, and if the attack had come at a time when they were filled to occupancy, the evacuation would not have been successful."

The impact changed tower structures in two critical ways... First, of the 47 columns in the core of each building, 9 were either severed or badly damaged in the north tower, and 11 in the south tower. Second, the impact dislodged the fireproofing that was sprayed on the floors and the columns. As the fires ignited by the jet fuel burned, the floors were weakened.

The floors played an important role in the structures, because they connected the exterior supports... to the columns hidden in the cores of the buildings. As the unprotected floors were weakened by fire, the exterior columns bowed inwards. In the north tower, they had moved 55 inches off center a few minutes before the collapse; in the south tower, they were 20 inches off center. As those columns became unstable, the building load shifted, but the instability was too great and the cascade of collapse began.

Much of the jet fuel burned outside the buildings in a fireball, but enough remained inside to ignite the office furnishings and building contents.

...the investigation ... raised serious questions about the adequacy of the original fireproofing applied to the steel in the towers. But in the areas where the fires were most severe, the amount of fireproofing that originally had been applied was ''moot'' because whatever had been there was knocked off by the planes.

During the design of the trade center, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey had decided to use a new version of the city building code that did not require as many staircases as the earlier edition. Instead of six staircases, including a specially reinforced fire escape, the trade center had three stairs in each tower. The investigators determined, though, that even the liberalized code required a fourth staircase, to accommodate the more than 1,000 people expected in the restaurant at the top of the north tower and at the observation deck atop the south tower.

As an interstate agency, the Port Authority is not bound by local building codes, but it had publicly pledged to ''meet or exceed'' the city code in building the trade center. However, the institute investigators determined that the Port Authority had not supplied enough staircases.

One of the documents included in yesterday's report showed that the Port Authority was eager to cut down on the amount of space devoted to stairs.

''The tower core should be redesigned to eliminate the fire towers and to take advantage of the more lenient provisions regarding exit stairs,'' wrote Malcolm P. Levy, the Port Authority's chief planning engineer, who is now deceased.

In the impact area of the north tower, the three staircases were about 70 feet apart and were destroyed immediately.

In the south tower, the plane hit on floors where the three staircases were about 200 feet apart, and one of them survived at least partially intact.

Next questions:
What are current/proposed requirements regarding staircases, number and dimensions?
What are ideal (according to NIST and NFPA) standards?

Some updates: construction safety & Triangle Shirtwaist history

Two things.

1) Here are two e-mails I got today and yesterday from the Department of Buildings. Forgive the basic nature of the questions I ask. I actually asked them about a week ago but they've been slow to reply ("Hi! I'm Andrew, from the Washington Square News!"). Included is a link to Patricia Lancaster's testimony in the first graf.

---- email 1, begin ----

In [DoB Comish. Patricia Lancaster's] testimony [on Feb 4th, the topic of the NYT article we read last week], the Commissioner recommends the City pursue three pieces of legislation: 
  
 1) a law for general contractors to be licensed through a
registration requirement, 
  
 2) a law for concrete contractors to be licensed through a
registration requirement, and 
  
3) a law requiring a concrete safety manager to oversee
concrete operations on high-rise construction sites. 
  
The impetus here is the absence of an accountability scheme
amongst the contractors on a job site. 
  
A registration requirement for GCs and concrete contractors
would obviously provide sharper enforcement teeth, as there would be the threat of revoking the registration if contractors are found after to due process to routinely violate or disregard safety rules and regulations. 
The registration requirement would also empower the Department to track contractors’ performance across job sites. Currently, this is nearly impossible to do because a corporation can change its name from
job site to job site. For recent example, you can look at the permits issued for the new building under construction at 525 Clinton Street, the site in Brooklyn where the scaffold worker died last week. A general contractor called Clinton Court Development LLC pulled the permits issued for that job site. When we search our data as it relates to Clinton Court Development LLC, we find only violations and permits issued related to work at 525 Clinton Avenue. It is possible the owners of Clinton Court Development LLC also own corporations that are building developments in other parts of the borough or the city, but there is no way to know for sure. With the infrastructure we have in place today, we cannot holistically track contractors’ performance across job sites and hold them accountable, unless the general contractor retains the same name across job sites. 
  
 As the Commissioner said in response to a question at the
hearing, it is surprising that in this day and age, of the 29 trades licensed by the Buildings Department, general contractors are not one of them. Requiring a general contractor to register would empower the Buildings Department with a tool to track a contractor’s performance across job sites and hold him accountable for his actions. 
 
Carly Sullivan
Assistant Press Secretary
NYC Department of Buildings
T: (212) 566-3473
F: (212) 566-3865
 
www.NYC.gov/buildings

---e-mail 1 ends -----

---e-mail 2 begins ---

Andrew:  See Below.  Let me know if you have any questions.  Thanks.
 
On Background:
  
RE: Who has the DOB consulted in creating this new proposed set of regulations? Labor? Industry? Immigrant groups? Builders who use non-union workers? Other jurisdictions?
  
Please specify which regulations you are referring to.
  
RE: Who has opposed this new set of regulations, and who is for?
  
Please specify which regulations you are referring to.  
  
RE:  Was the DOB planning on making these changes beforehand?
  
Since November, the Buildings Department has been working to devise legislative and non-legislative solutions to address the problem of concrete operations on high-rise construction sites.  On January 23, 2008, Commissioner Lancaster sent a memo to the industry outlining best practices to avoid concrete-related accidents. 
 
RE: Unions say that non-unionized work is to blame for the majority [73%] of accidents during construction. Is this true?
 
The Buildings Department does not track this data.  Buildings data shows that construction incidents on high-rise construction sites, which comprise union and non-union labor sites, increased 49% over the last year, from 69 in CY 2006 to 103 in CY 2007
 
RE: Do you have any data that bears this out, or disproves it? How does the DOB intend on tackling this issue?
 
See above.
 
RE: Does the DOB see illegal immigrant and non-English workers as a major concern for construction safety?  How does the DOB intend to address these issues, if so?
 
In 2006, the Buildings Department, Mayor’s Office of Immigrant Affairs and Occupational Safety and Health Administration convened a Scaffold Worker Safety Task Force after a series of scaffold-related incidents.  The Task Force found speaking English as a second language or speaking a language different than that spoken at the job site was often a factor in fatal construction accidents.  Since 2006, Buildings, MOIA and OSHA have conducted outreach events across the five boroughs to distribute safety information in multiple languages to day laborers and discussed with workers how to stay safe on the job. Under the Task Force, the training requirements for suspended scaffolds are being streamlined, the Buildings Department and OSHA are conducting cross-trainings and performing joint inspections, and a Scaffold Safety Team, which proactively inspects scaffold, was created at the Buildings Department in August 2007. 
 
RE: Why were concrete workers not required to register with the City in the past? 
There was no law requiring them to do so.  
 
RE: What problems do you foresee in this registration process? (For example, I hear that the DCA sometimes has problems registering home renovation contractors to any effect because businesses appear and disappear to evade accountability.)
 
First of all, the Commissioner has recommended the Council seek legislation requiring concrete contractors to register. She has expressed her support for such legislation. But let’s be clear, the legislation hasn’t been proposed yet or signed into law. We are well aware of the issue you bring up here with the HIC contractors. The Department is exploring ways in which it can avoid this evasion of responsibility and accountability.  

---- end e-mail ----

2) Here's an e-mail from Prof. Richard Greenwald, NYU grad and professor at Drew University in Madison, NJ. He's an expert on the Triangle Shirtwaist fire. Of course this is just an overview: most important is his contact information, below. The NYU History faculty has not been so helpful. The link to his book on the fire is below.

---- begin e-mail. -----

>> Could you please describe very briefly the significance of the 1911 fire, and what it helped change in city government and regulations in the following years?

The Triangle Fire, which was the subject of my 2005 book, had an enormous effect on both labor policies and regulations over building in NYC and beyond. After the fire, the state of NY created the Factory Investigating Committee, a committee chaired by Al Smith and Robert Wagner, then leaders of both the state assembly and senate repressively. Smith and Wagner were joined by public members of the FIC. From 1911-1915, the FIC rewrote NYS factory regulations, including occupancy rules, fire safety rules and significant labor regulations. The uproar in the city and state and the death of so many mostly young immigrant women, created a political atmosphere where quick action was possible. Part of the answer is that Tammany Hall, then in firm control of both the state and city government was moved by the fire and working-class political action. Many scholars look at the fire as one of the moments in the creation of modern liberalism.. Frances Perkins, then a lead investigator for the FIC, later a New deal Sec of Labor, said that the new deal was born on March 25, 1911. So, part of the reason for the change was a change in political sensibilities.

Richard Greenwald, Dean Caspersen School of Graduate Studies Director, Business, Society & Culture Program Associate Professor of History Drew University Madison, NJ 07940 Ph: 973/408-3958 Email: rgreenwa@drew.edu 

----- e-mail done----

Private Evacuation Consultants: 2/11 memo

This memo packages everything I've come across so far. First I list questions I'm looking into. Then I provide background on the issue. The third section lists potential sources. The final section identifies next steps. It's all in short-hand, and some of it is a note to myself. Let me know if you have any questions and I can explain.

I'm looking at the post-9/11 industry of private evacuation consultants. 2004 Local Law 26 (LL26) required all commercial buildings over 20 stories to develop "emergency evacuation plans" (EAPs), and developed detailed EAP criteria and specs. Overnight a new security consulting industry emerged, and dozens of firms cropped up. I'm going to explore this phenomena, asking some of the questions I've listed below.

I want to look at EAPs specifically (a subset of LL26, not the whole statute). So I will not look at (unless it comes up in my investigation of EAP industries)

• Construction
• Emergency responders
  
• Safety "hardware": fireproofing, stair width, communications, etc.
• Fireprevention / inspections / fire safety education

Questions (no particular order)

Does this system succeed? In other words, are building occupants prepared for emergency evacuation? Is there any way to measure this?

How important are evacuation strategies? Is it realistic to expect one training every three years (the frequency mandated by LL26) will really make a difference in an emergency?

From the NIST and WTC Task Forces, which recommendations were not implemented into LL26 / new building codes? Does anyone think that EAPs are a panacea, and some more of the unimplemented recommendations were more important (but difficult to implement)?

Why does LL26 specify EAPs for “non-fire emergencies”? (why exclude fires?)

How big is the EAP consultant industry? How much money is there in it? Who’s doing it well, who poorly? Are any non-accredited? Any scandals?

Everyone had to get compliance by August 2006. What are these firms doing now?

Businesses contract (sometimes through the building) with EAP consultants. But what about non-business building employees, such as janitorial staff. Do they receive EAP training?

Background

Pre-9/11 codes

No evacuation strategy needed.

Loose and unenforced building codes complicated evacuation on 9/11. For example a 1968 code curtailed stairway number and width requirements. NYT 8/6/04): “According to a study by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, the 1968 code effectively permitted the Port Authority to decrease the number of stairwells in the trade center from six to three in each of the towers - a change sought by the real estate industry so that more space on each floor would be available for rent.”

NIST

I need to scan relevant sections, NYC (DOB and WTC Building Code Task Force) response

World Trade Center Building Code Task Force

World Trade Center Building Code Task Force published 21 recommendations in February of 2003. September 2004. Bloomberg press release: "13 of these recommendations were incorporated into the bill before me today (Intro 126A); the remaining eight are being implemented by rule change or are still under technical review.”

Intro 126-A (passed 6/7/04)

I'm not certain what the legal relationship b/w Intro 126-A and LL26 is, but they're essentially the same regulation. I think "Intro" is the term the Council uses before its legislation.

“§27-4267.4 Evacuation of office buildings and buildings classified in occupancy group E [office space over 75 feet, or 20 stories]. The commissioner shall promulgate rules establishing standards, procedures and requirements for the orderly evacuation of occupants from any office building or building classified in occupancy group E or part thereof in the interests of public safety, including but not limited to the evacuation of persons necessitated by fire, explosion, biological, chemical or hazardous material incident or release, natural disaster or other emergency, or the threat thereof. Such rules may require the owners of such buildings to develop a written emergency action plan, with provisions for identifying qualified personnel, conducting drills, distributing instructions or informative materials to occupants, and/or such other standards, procedures or requirements that the fire commissioner determines will serve to ensure orderly evacuation. Such rules may also establish requirements for the occupants of such buildings with respect to evacuation and the planning therefore. These requirements shall be in addition to the requirements of other provisions of sections 27-4267 or 27-4267.3 of this code and any other law, rule or regulation enforced by the department.”

• One requirement (retroactive and prospective): Mandatory evacuation plans for non-fire related emergencies [Why limited to non-fire?]
• The law grants the Fire Commissioner the legal authority to require emergency action plans for commercial high-rise buildings and contains new emergency action plan requirements for commercial high-rise buildings. (Council 4/18/07)
• The FDNY worked collaboratively with DOB and engaged the private real estate sector in dialogue during the development of a high-rise building emergency action plan that details new requirements and guidelines under the new law. The FDNY has developed a formal process for submission to and review by the BFP of these plans. These requirements went into effect in August 2006 for all commercial buildings higher than 20 stories. The law also requires building owners and management agents to educate the occupants of these commercial high-rise buildings and provide and test evacuation with these occupants. (ibid)

Local Law 26 / Emergency Action Plans

April 6, 2006 - 3 RCNY §6-02

MUST READ all pages of FDNY’s final LL26 rule: http://www.nyc.gov/html/fdny/html/rcny_legal/rcny_3rcny_sect_6_02.shtml

Local Law 26 of 2004 required that the Fire Commissioner adopt standards, procedures and requirements for the orderly evacuation of occupants from any office building, including evacuation of persons necessitated by explosion, biological, chemical or hazardous material incidents or releases, natural disasters or other emergency, or the threat thereof.

The final rule requires that each office building subject to the requirements of the rule prepare an Emergency Action Plan, submit it for Fire Department review and acceptance, and implement it within designated time frames.

The final rule requires that owners of office buildings develop procedures for sheltering in place, in-building relocation, partial evacuation and full evacuation of the building, in response to various emergency scenarios. The final rule sets forth specific guidelines and requirements for the form and content of the Emergency Action Plan.


9/10/06 - 3 RCNY §9-08

The Fire Department rule setting forth these standards, procedures and requirements was promulgated on April 6, 2006 as 3 RCNY §6-02, “Office Building Emergency Action Plans”. The rule requires the designation of a Fire Safety/Emergency Action Plan Director and sets forth the minimum qualifications for such director, including a requirement to successfully complete at least a seven-hour training course approved by the Department and offered by an educational institution or other organization accredited by the Department.

The Fire Department is now promulgating a rule setting forth minimum instructional and administration requirements for Fire Department accreditation of courses taught by educational institutions to qualify students for the Fire Safety/EAP Director Certificate of Fitness to be issued by the Department.
Bureau of Fire Prevention reviews and approves the plans. Currently no oversight mechanism (http://www.nyc.gov/html/fdny/pdf/strat_plan/2007/goal_5.pdf, page two)

Private firms: what they do, how they function, etc.

From Quality Fire-Protection Consultants, Inc.

• EAP Drafting – We can design and implement an emergency action plan for your building. This plan will conform to FDNY’s requirements and ensure that your building is adequately prepared for non-fire emergencies. We can also update or modify existing plans.
• EAP Drills – Local Law #26 requires that EAP drills be conducted regularly. Our ongoing EAP drill program will provide the necessary training for occupants so that they will react rationally and orderly when confronted with an emergency. We offer drills by floor or for your entire building, as required by the FDNY.
• EAP Training – We will train your building’s deputy EAP director, EAP wardens, and EAP brigade in EAP response techniques. This will include portable extinguisher selection and usage, evacuation procedures, and fire department notification. Two hours initial training (three for deputy directors) and one hour annual training are required by law.
• EAP Seminars and Additional Training – We can provide comprehensive training seminars for your EAP wardens, deputy EAP wardens, and searchers via our multimedia presentation, either in person or online. This seminar will teach your EAP warden team members their various responsibilities and how to interact with the building’s emergency response team and the local fire department in the event of a non-fire emergency.
• Online Training – Our training sessions and seminars can be conducted online and tailored to your individual building.
• Violation Correction – Should your property be issued violations by the FDNY, our staff will assist you by providing necessary documentation and guidance throughout the correction process.
• Building Inspection – We can provide a full on-site building EAP inspection. We will then prepare a written report to inform you of our findings. We will make recommendations so that your building will meet all EAP requirements.

Sources

Codes organizations

National Fire Protection Association, Jack Murphy
National Center for Infrastructure Expertise

Those involved in passing and enforcing LL26
Real Estate Board of New York
Skyscraper Safety Campaign, Sally Regenhard
FDNY Public Information, James Long (double check)

EAP Training Courses
EAP Director Training Course
Total Safety Consulting
Global Security Group
Quality Fire-Protection Consultants, Inc. (largest in NYC)
SafirRosetti (as in Howard Safir)
TRC Fire Safety

Steps

• Contact skyscraper safety campaign, have meeting
• Talk to someone at NFPA
• Read LL 26
• Read NIST
• Talk to an office manager (Pam Stanley)
  
• Talk to a building manager (Pam's recommendation)